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STUDENT PROJECT
Recent Developments:
The Uniform Arbitration Act*
I. SECTION 1: VALIDITY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Section 1 of the UAA states:
[a] written agreement to submit any existing controversy to
arbitration or a provision in a written contract to submit to
arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties
is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. This
act also applies to arbitration agreements between employers and
employees or between their respective representatives [unless
otherwise provided in the agreement].'
Courts are often faced with issues relating to the application of the Uniform
Arbitration Act (UAA) to disputes between parties. When a dispute arises, the first
inquiry by the court must be whether the parties have entered into a valid agreement
to arbitrate. This question must be answered in the affirmative before any other
section of the UAA becomes an issue. In determining the validity of an arbitration
agreement the court looks for certain factors including: the existence of a written
agreement between parties, whether the dispute arose outof a provision within the
scope of the arbitration agreement, and whether the agreement itself is within the
public interest.
A. Written Agreement Between Parties
In determining whether there is a valid agreement to arbitrate, courts refuse
to enforce arbitration agreements unless there is a written agreement between the
parties. In Jones v. Davis,2 the Washington Court of Appeals upheld the denial of
the motion for a stay pending arbitration because the parties to the dispute did not
have a written arbitration agreement.3 Jones, a prospective home purchaser,
authorized her real estate agent to hire an inspector to perform an inspection of the
home.' The agent contacted an inspector whom she had done business with in the

*. This project was prepared by Journal of Dispute Resolution candidates under the direction of
Associate Editor in Chief Earl D. Kraus.
1. U.A.A. § 1 (1997).
2. 2000 WL 628789 at *2 (Wash. App. May 12, 2000).
3. Id.

4. Id.
at *1.
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past.' In previous dealings between the inspector and the agent, the inspector had
written agreements with the agent that included written arbitration provisions.6 After
completion of the inspection, the agent sent Jones the inspection report and a copy
of the written agreement that included an arbitration provision. 7 After closing on the
house Jones discovered structural problems, and she subsequently filed suit against
the inspector.8 The inspector moved for a stay pending arbitration. In denying the
stay, the court rejected the inspector's argument that a valid contract existed with the
purchaser through her real estate agent. 9
However, in Topolski v. Helena Association of Realtors, Inc.,'0 the court
determined that even though the brokers did not directly enter into any agreement
with the clients to arbitrate disputes, the real estate brokers had to arbitrate disputes
with clients because the terms of their membership in a trade association required
arbitration." The brokers were voluntary members in a trade association whose
bylaws contained provisions requiring association members to arbitrate disputes
brought by a client arising out of an agency relationship so long as the client agreed
to be bound by the arbitration.' 2 The brokers claimed that because they had only
entered into a contract between them and the association, not any client, the
agreement could not extend to anyone who was not a member of the association. 3
The Supreme Court of Montana disagreed, stating that as voluntary members of the
association, they agreed to be bound by the provisions and their obligation to
arbitrate could not have been more clear.1 4 Courts will refuse to confirm arbitration
awards if the parties only orally agreed to arbitrate.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals, in Custom Built Homes by Ed Harrisv.
McNamara," affirmed a trial court order to not confirm an arbitration award because
the written agreement requirement was not satisfied.'6 The case, which had a bizarre
procedural history, arose out of a dispute over a contract for the construction of a
home for the McNamaras. 7 Custom Built Homes by Ed Harris (Custom) filed suit
against the McNamaras for a breach of contract. 8 The McNamaras subsequently
filed a motion for arbitration." Custom filed a response claiming that no binding
arbitration agreement existed because the paragraph referring to arbitration in the
contract was not individually initialed or signed by the parties.2 0 The trial court
entered a confusing order to the motions seemingly denying the defendant's efforts

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at *2.
10. 15 P.3d 414 (Mont. 2000).
11. Id. at 417.
12. Id.at 415.
13. Id.at 416.
14. Id.
15. 2000 WL 14672 (Tenn. App. Jan. 10, 2000).
16. Id. at *3.
17. Id. at *1.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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to compel arbitration.2 1 However, the parties then orally agreed to binding
arbitration and participated in arbitration, awarding damages to the McNamaras.22
The trial court denied the McNamaras' motion to confirm the arbitrator's award."
In explaining the denial, the court cited the absence of a written agreement as
required by statute and the allegations by Custom that the oral agreement had
included a limitation that expert witnesses were allowed in the arbitration which had
not been honored by the arbitrator.24 In affirming the trial court's denial of
confirmation, the appellate court stated that no binding agreement to arbitrate existed
in the contract because the clause providing for arbitration was not signed or initialed
by the parties.2" The court rejected the McNamaras' argument that the oral
arbitration agreement should be enforced.26 Instead, the court stated that the trial
court's order indicated a lack of understanding as to the expert witness limitation
specified by the parties, thus the trial court did not err in denying confirmation of the
award.27
B. Scope of the Agreement
In addition to finding that a written arbitration agreement exists between
parties, courts must also determine whether the specific dispute in question falls
within the substantive scope of that agreement. In Long v. Silver,2s the United States
District Court for the Western District of North Carolina held that an arbitration
clause in a written agreement entered into between shareholders did not cover the
diverse claims in the complaint.29 In Long, the parties entered into an agreement
which contained an arbitration provision stating that parties must submit to
arbitration any dispute arising out of the agreement.30 However, the agreement,
which was only between shareholder Long and the company with which his stock
would be traded, did nothing more than restrict each shareholder's right to sell
stock. 3 The complaint raised by Long against the officers and other shareholders,
on the other hand, alleged a breach of contract, fraud, frustration of reasonable
expectation, and failure to distribute profits proportionately, among other things.32
Contrary to the officers' and other shareholders' argument, the court found that in
looking at the language of the agreement, the parties could not have intended to bind
themselves to the arbitration of the broad range of claims raised in the instant
complaint.33 Therefore, the motion to compel arbitration was denied.34

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at **1-2.
Id.
Id. at **2-3.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
123 F. Supp. 2d 875 (W.D. N.C. 2000).
Id. at 880.
Id. at 877.
Id. at 878.
Id. at 879.
Id. at 881.
Id. at 883.
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In Schwentker v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc.," the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana analyzed whether the scope of an
arbitration clause in an option account agreement extended to disputes arising out of
a separate stock account.3 6 Ms. Schwentker opened both a stock account and an
option account with A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. (hereinafter Edwards)." Subsequent
to the establishment of the option account, Schwentker signed an "Option Account
Agreement," which contained an arbitration provision stating that "all controversies
between me and Edwards... which may arise for any cause whatsoever, shall be
determined by arbitration."3 A dispute arose solely concerning the stock account,
and Schwentker filed suit.39 Schwentker argued that the scope of the arbitration
clause was ambiguous and encompassed only issues arising under the option account
and not the stock account.40 Edwards argued that the dispute fell within the "all
controversies" wording in the arbitration provision and was thus arbitrable.4 '
Further, Edwards contended that the arbitrability of the dispute was also arbitrable. 2
The court agreed with Edwards, stating that the arbitration clause indicated no
limitation to the subject matter of what is arbitrable.43 The court found the only
limitation in the arbitration provision to be that of excluding disputes that arose prior
to the agreement. 44
In Solle v. Western States InsuranceAgency, Inc., 5 Solle and Western
States Insurance Agency, Inc. (Western) entered into a one-year employment
contract containing a provision that any dispute arising under the provisions of the
contract would be submitted to arbitration.46 Western failed to renew the contract
after one year, and Solle filed suit claiming she had a reasonable expectation that
Western would offer such a renewal.47 Western alleged that the contract governed
Solle's employment, and was arbitrable because the claim for wrongful termination
arose out of the contract.48 Conversely, Solle argued that she did not claim a
violation of any of the terms of the employment contract, but that she brought a tort
claim for failure to renew a contract. 49 The court agreed with Western that the
employment contract governed Solle's employment, termination, and post
employment relationship, and did not explicitly exclude disputes arising after
termination of the contract.50 The court cited Nolde Bros., Inc. v. Bakery &
Confectionery Workers Union,5 stating "there is little reason to construe this contract

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

2000 WL 988517 (S.D. Ind. June 6, 2000).
Id.at *2.
Id.
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.at *2.
Id.
Id.
Id.at *5.
id.
999 P.2d 328 (Mont. 2000).
Id. at 330.
Id.
Id.at 332.
Id.
Id.at 333.
430 U.S. 243 (1977).
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to mean that the parties intended their contractual duty to submit grievances and
claims arising under the contract to terminate immediately on the termination of the
upheld the trial court's ruling
contract ... "52 Thus, the Supreme Court of Montana
53
granting Western's motion to compel arbitration.
Sometimes the court must resolve ambiguity in the terms of the arbitration
provision to determine whether the dispute is arbitrable. An insurance policy in
Allstate Insurance Co. v. Perea5 4 contained an arbitration clause providing that an
arbitration award is binding if it does not exceed the limits of the financial
responsibility law of New Mexico. 5 The clause went on to state that if an arbitration
award exceeds the financial responsibility limits, either party has a right to trial on
the issues. 6 After an arbitration panel awarded $52,500 to the defendant, Allstate
filed suit in district court.5 7 The mandatory financial responsibility limit of New
Mexico was $25,000, but the principle ofjudicial stacking, if applied, would increase
the limit from $25,000 to $75,000 because the defendant had three insurance
policies.5 Therefore, the issue became whether "financial responsibility limits" as
stated in the policy meant the judicially stacked $75,000 coverage or the single
$25,000 mandatory amount.5 9 The New Mexico Court of Appeals concluded that
the language of the contract plainly referred to the single $25,000. 60 Furthermore,
pursuant to the contract, the arbitration award exceeded the allowable limit in the
arbitration clause and thus was not an award under a valid arbitration agreement. 6'
In Lewis v. CEDUEducationalServices, Inc.,62 a mother and child entered
into a contract with CEDU Educational Services, Inc. (CEDU) that provided for the
child's enrollment in an educational program offered by CEDU. 63 The enrollment
agreement contained a provision compelling arbitration of any controversy between
the parties arising out of the contract, and an additional provision providing that no
promise was valid or binding on the defendant if it was not contained in the
agreement.64 After a riot took place at an academy of the defendant, an employee
of the defendant assured the mother of the child's safety if he were allowed to
remain.65 After choosing to remain, the child was injured by another student.66 The
67
mother and child subsequently filed suit claiming a breach of an express warranty.
The district court ruled that the breach of an express warranty arising out of these
events was not subject to arbitration since it did not arise out of the terms of the

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 254.
Solle, 999 P.2d at 333.
8 P.3d 166 (N.M. App. 2000).
Id.at 167.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 169.
Id.
at 170.
Id.
15 P.3d 1147 (Idaho 2000).
Id.at 1149, 1152.
Id. at 1149.
Id. at 1152.
Id.
Id. at 1149.
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contract.6 The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed, stating that a claim for breach of
an express warranty is normally a contract issue and thus is directly related to the
terms and provisions within the contract.6 9 Therefore, the claim was subject to
arbitration. °
The issue in front of the Colorado Court of Appeals in the case In re the
Marriageof Popack,7' was the validity and application of an arbitration agreement
entered into between a husband and wife providing for the arbitration of marital
disputes by a rabbinical council.72 At the time the parties entered into the agreement,
the wife had commenced a legal separation proceeding. 73 The court dismissed the
separation action with the parties consent after the council arbitrated and court
adopted the temporary orders. 74 Later, the wife requested a decree of dissolution of
marriage and requested the court enter temporary orders. 75 The husband moved to
strike the wife's motion for temporary orders on the basis that the orders were
arbitrable under the agreement. 6 The trial court disagreed with the husband,
concluding that the agreement was entered into as part of the earlier legal separation
proceedings and had no application to the present proceedings.77 The Colorado
Court of Appeals reversed, finding that because the parties entered into the
agreement in the context of a legal separation proceeding and are now engaged in
a dissolution proceeding did not affect the validity and application of the
agreement. 78 The court explained that the language of the agreement evidenced an
intent by the parties to arbitrate all matters related to their marriage, present or
future. 79 Therefore, because the dispute fell within the arbitration provision, the
appellate court remanded the case for a trial court determination of whether the
agreement was conscionable and entered into voluntarily by the parties.80
Often the court must determine the proper standard of review in a trial
court's confirmation of an arbitration panel's determination. In DMS PropertiesFirst,Inc. v. P. W.Scott Associates,Inc.8 an arbitration panel granted Scott's Motion
to Dismiss on the ground that no valid agreement to arbitrate existed between it and
DMS 2 DMS asked the court of chancery to vacate the dismissal by the arbitration
panel. 3 In upholding the arbitration panel's dismissal, the court of chancery applied
a deferential standard of review to the arbitrators' determinations." In DMS's
subsequent appeal, the Supreme Court of Delaware ruled that the court of chancery

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 1152.
Id. at 1153.
Id.
998 P.2d 464 (Colo. App. 2000).
Id. at 465.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 466.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 467.
Id.
Id.
748 A.2d 389 (Del. 2000).
Id. at 390.
Id.
Id.
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erred in applying a deferential standard of review."5 The court noted that there was
no request to compel or enjoin arbitration to the court of chancery, thus the threshold
question in front of the court of chancery was the question of arbitrability itself.86
If the parties did not clearly agree to submit the question of arbitrability to
arbitration, the reviewing court must decide arbitrability independently and without
deference.87 The Supreme Court of Delaware stated that since the record reflected
that the parties did not agree to submit the question of arbitrability to arbitration, the
issue was subject to a de novo determination by the court of chancery.88 Because the
arbitration panel's decision to grant Scott's Motion to Dismiss was improperly given
deference by the court of chancery, the supreme court remanded the judgment for
de novo review.89
In DDI Architects, P. C, v. Dale,' the court used a broad standard in
determining whether the dispute was within the scope of the arbitration agreement. 9'
The case arose out of a complaint filed by DDI for copyright infringement and
various other claims. 92 After the referral of the case to arbitration, the dispute arose
as to whether Dale's counterclaims were within the oral agreement to arbitrate and
thus subject to arbitration. 93 The Pennsylvania court stated that when determining
whether a dispute falls within the scope of the agreement, the court could not stay
arbitration unless it could state "with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is
not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute." 94 The court
denied DDI's petition to stay arbitration because this standard was not met, and an
interpretation of the agreement that covered the counterclaims was reasonable and
probable.9" The court's reasoning stemmed from the ambiguity of the statement by
the plaintiff's counsel that the parties had agreed to arbitrate "the disputes set forth
in the Complaint." 96 The court noted that this ambiguous language could reasonably
be construed to cover the counterclaims and should be construed against DDI, the
drafter.97 Additional evidence noted by the court indicating the parties intent to
resolve all claims in arbitration were the fact that the parties had contracted for an
arbitrator with architectural fee dispute experience, the parties agreement that the
matter be dismissed without prejudice, and that the fact that the counterclaims arose
out of the same facts and were "entwined" with Dale's affirmative defenses to DDI's
claims. 98 It should be noted that although the agreement to arbitrate was not in
writing, it was enforced according to Pennsylvania statute. 99 Recognizing that the
agreement was not written, the court refused to apply the Pennsylvania Uniform

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 393.
Id. at 391.
Id.
Id. at 392-93.
Id.at393.
2000 WL 1146616 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 2000).
Id.
Id.at *1.
Id.
Id.at *2.
Id.at *4.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *2.
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Arbitration Act.'00 Instead, because the parties only orally agreed to arbitrate their
disputes, the arbitration agreement was governed by the state common law.' '
However, under the Pennsylvania common law arbitration statute,'0 2 the
Pennsylvania equivalent of section one of the UAA relating to the validity of the
agreement to arbitrate applied to common law arbitration.' 3
C. Public Policy
While courts generally hold that written arbitration agreements are valid
and enforceable, the arbitration agreement can be invalidated if it violates public
policy. In Showmethemoney Check Cashers,Inc. v. Williams,' ° the Supreme Court
of Arkansas ruled that an arbitration agreement that lacked mutuality was not valid
and enforceable to compel arbitration.'05 Under the terms of the agreement drafted
by Showmethemoney Check Cashers, Inc. (Showme), customers of Showme had to
submit all disputes to arbitration, while Showme itself could proceed directly to court
if it chose.'0 6 The court explained that while strong policy arguments for
encouraging arbitration agreements existed, the agreements should not be "used as
a shield against litigation by one party while simultaneously reserving solely to itself
the sword of a court action."'" 1 The court thus held the arbitration agreement invalid
because customers of Showme were required to submit all disputes to arbitration
while Showme itself could proceed to court.'0 8
For a court to find the arbitration agreement invalid, the agreement itself,
not the merits of the underlying dispute, must be against public policy. In Burkhart
v. Semitool, Inc.,'0 9 the Supreme Court of Montana reversed an order of summary
judgment entered by the district court and remanded the claims for arbitration
because the arbitration agreement itself was valid." 0 Burkhart, an attorney, had
accepted an offer of employment as patent counsel for the defendant, Semitool."'
This offer included a provision providing that claims arising out of employment
termination shall be settled by arbitration pursuant to Montana's Uniform Arbitration
Act."' After the termination of the attorney's employment, he filed suit for wrongful
discharge, among other claims."13 In its reasoning, the district court stated that the
arbitration agreement was not valid and enforceable to the extent that it required the
arbitration of issues requiring the violation of the attorney-client privilege and thus
prejudiced the public interest."' The Supreme Court of Montana, in reversing the

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. 42 Pa. Consol. Stat. Ann. §§ 7341-7343 (1998).
103. Id.
104. 27 S.W.3d 361 (Ark. 2000).
105. Id. at 367.
106. Id. at 366-67.
107. Id. at 367.
108. Id.
109. 5 P.3d 1031 (Mont. 2000).
110. Id. at 1035.
111. Id. at1033.
af9 3 " 27-5-211 (2001).
112. frk~ar,.
113.
114. Id. at1034.
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district court, clarified the exception to the validity of arbitration agreements
explaining that the violation of public interest exception pertained to the validity of
the arbitration agreement itself, not to the merits of the underlying dispute."' The
court stated that because a valid offer to arbitrate was made and accepted, arbitration
was the sole remedy 16and the district court no longer had jurisdiction to decide the
merits of the claim."
D. Preclusion by Other Statutes
Occasionally statutes require the resolution of certain types of claims by a
specific procedure, and thus preclude resolution through arbitration. This was
precisely the issue in Correll v. DistinctiveDentalServices, P.A. 1 7 Under the facts
of this Minnesota case, Correl previously accepted employment with Distinctive
Dental Services, P.A. (DDS) and entered into an employment agreement which
included both a non-competition provision and an arbitration clause." 8 DDS later
terminated Correll's employment stating that Correll's wife's position with a
competing dentist violated the non-compete clause in the employment contract." 9
Correll thus filed suit alleging marital status discrimination. 2 0 A dispute arose as to
whether the Minnesota Human Rights Act rendered this claim exempt from
arbitration since it provides an exclusive method of resolving claims under the
Act. 2 ' The Minnesota Supreme Court held that the exclusive procedure provision
of the Minnesota Human Rights Act prevailed over the Minnesota arbitration statute
as an exception to the general rule that arbitration agreements are enforceable. 2 2 In
reaching its decision, the court cited previous case law consistent with its opinion
and legislative history suggesting that the Arbitration Act was not intended to prevail
over the Minnesota Human Rights Act.'23
II. SECTION 2: PROCEEDINGS TO COMPEL OR STAY ARBITRATION

Section two of the UAA is one of the fundamental provisions in the model
statute. In essence, section two provides that where there is a valid agreement to
arbitrate, and the dispute falls with in the scope of that agreement, a court "shall
order the parties to proceed with arbitration .... ', 4 If one party challenges the
existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate, however, courts are responsible for
proceeding "summarily to the determination of the issue so raised .... ", 5 Section
two further provides that a court may stay arbitration proceedings upon a showing

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 1035.
Id.
607 N.W.2d 440 (Minn. 2000).
Id. at 442.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 446.
Id.
U.A.A. § 2(a).
Id.
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that no arbitration agreement exists. 126 The following are a few of the many cases
involving the UAA that specifically address section two.
A. The Existence of an Arbitration Agreement
In Thompson v. Norfolk Southern Railway Compan,12 the court had the
opportunity to review an alleged arbitration agreement. In this action, Thompson
brought suit against Norfolk Southern Railway Company ("Norfolk") and the City
of Salisbury ("Salisbury") for damages sustained in a car-to-train collision. 2 After
filing his claim, however, Thompson decided to seek arbitration of the dispute based
on the theory that he was a third29party beneficiary to an insurance agreement
between Salisbury and its insurer. 1
The insurance agreement provided, inter alia,that the insurer had the right
to defend Salisbury in any "suit" for damages brought against the city. 30 Because
the definition of suit in the insurance policy included arbitration proceedings,
Thompson claimed that the policy required Salisbury to arbitrate any suit for bodily
injury.' 3 ' The trial court disagreed, however, and found that the agreement between
Salisbury and the insurer did not contain an agreement to arbitrate as required by the
UAA. 3 2 Thereafter, Thompson appealed the decision to dismiss his motion to
compel arbitration to the North Carolina Court of Appeals.1 33 The court, relying on
the language of the insurance agreement, concluded that Salisbury and its insurer did
not agree to submit all claims for damages to arbitration. 34 Instead, the agreement
merely stated that the definition of "suit" included any arbitration to which Salisbury
"must submit or do[es] submit with [the insurer's] consent.' 35 The court, therefore,
upheld the lower court's decision to deny Thompson's motion to compel
arbitration. 136
The existence of an arbitration agreement is also an important
consideration in a court's decision whether to grant or deny a motion to stay
arbitration. For example, in DDI Architects, P.C. v. Dale,'37 the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania had to decide the validity of
a motion to stay the arbitration of a defendant's counterclaims. 3
On February 23, 2000, Plaintiff DDI Architects, P.C. ("DDI") filed a
complaint and motion for a temporary restraining order ("TRO") seeking to enjoin
the defendant's use of DDI's architectural plans for a theme restaurant.13 9 The

126. Id. § 2(b).
127. 535 S.E.2d 397 (N.C. App. 2000).
128. Id. at 398-99.
129. Id. at 399.
130. Id. The insurance agreement provided that the insurer had "the right and duty to defend any suit
seeking... [compensatory] damages." Id. at 399.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 400. The North Carolina UAA is located at N.C. Gen. Stat. § § 1-567.1 - 1-567.20 (1999).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 400.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 400-01.
137. Dale, 2000 WL 1146616.
138. Id. at *1.
139. Id.
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parties agreed to submit the dispute to arbitration, and Dale filed an answer with the
American Arbitration Association that included counterclaims for defamation and
breach of fiduciary duty. 40 DDI then filed a motion to stay arbitration in the Court
of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.' 4 ' DDI also requested a TRO that would
enjoin Dale from raising the counterclaims in the arbitration proceeding on the
ground that the counterclaims lie outside the scope of the parties' agreement to
arbitrate. 42 After a series
of hearings on the matter, the lower court denied DDI's
43
request for the TRO.
On appeal, the court noted that "[c]ourts may stay an arbitration only upon
a showing that no agreement to arbitrate exists."'" Relying on prior case law, the
court determined that its inquiry is limited to the determination of "whether an
agreement to arbitrate was entered into and whether the dispute involved falls within
the scope of the arbitration provision." 45 In this case, the parties did not dispute the
existence of the arbitration agreement. 46 Therefore, the court's only task was to
decide if the parties' arbitration clause was susceptible to an interpretation that
would allow the arbitration of Dale's counterclaims. 41 Because the agreed upon
language of the arbitration agreement did not "inescapably restrict arbitration to the
specific legal claims of [DDI]," 41 the court upheld the lower49court's decision to deny
DDI's motion to stay arbitration of Dale's counterclaims.'
B. The Stay of Proceedings in Favor ofArbitration
In Liberty Mutual Insurance Company v. Ventimiglia,5 ° Liberty Mutual
Insurance Company ("Liberty") filed a petition for declaratory judgment asking the
court to declare that the company was not obligated to pay uninsured motorist
benefits to the defendant.' 5 ' Defendant sought arbitration of the matter, however,
and filed a motion to stay the action pending arbitration. 5 2 The court determined
that the defendant's motion should be treated as a motion to dismiss "because
declaratory judgment actions may be dismissed under [Federal Rule of Civil

140. Id. The complete list of the defendant's counterclaims includes: defamation, breach of fiduciary
duty, tortious interference with contract and business relations, and abuse of process. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at *2. Because the agreement to arbitrate was an oral agreement, the court determined that
Pennsylvania common law governed the dispute at hand. Id. However, the court noted that the same
legal standard for judging a motion to stay arbitration applies under the Federal Arbitration Act or
Pennsylvania law. Id. The court then determined that Title 42, sections 7304 and 7342(a) of the
Pennsylvania Code prohibit a court from issuing a stay of arbitration except where there is no valid
arbitration agreement. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at *2.
148. Id. at *3. The pertinent part of the parties' agreement to arbitrate was summarized by the
plaintiff's counsel in the following terms: "the parties have agreed to submit the disputes setforth in the
[clomplaint ....
IId. (emphasis added).
149. Id. at *4.
150. 104 F. Supp. 2d 469 (M.D. Pa. 2000).
151. Id. at 469.
152. Id.
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Procedure] 12(b)(6) where the dispute is covered by an arbitration agreement."' 53
The court then examined the language of the arbitration agreement and determined
that the question of "whether the insured defendant is entitled to recover damages
' 4
arbitration clause.' 1
. . is exactly the type of matter which is discussed in the
Thus, the court dismissed Liberty's declaratory judgment action "to allow the parties
to proceed under the appropriate arbitration procedures."' 5
In M.R. DillardConstructionv. J.P.Realty, 1, Inc.,"6 the Tennessee Court
of Appeals reached a different conclusion on the issue of staying arbitration than did
the court in Liberty. In MR. Dillard,the issue before the court was whether an
action to enforce a mechanics' lien should be stayed or dismissed pending
arbitration.17 The case began when M.R. Dillard Construction filed suit in the lower
court to enforce a mechanics' lien against J.P. Realty, II, Inc. ("J.P. Realty"). 58 In
response, J.P. Realty claimed an affirmative defense of arbitrability based on the
parties' contract.'" 9 M.R. Dillard then filed a motion to stay proceedings in favor of
arbitration."' ° Instead of issuing a stay, however, the lower court dismissed the
action without prejudice.161 On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Tennessee
determined that section two of the UAA,162 "required the trial court to stay, rather
than dismiss, any further proceedings with regard to the issues pending
arbitration. ' 63
Another issue that may arise under section two is whether the granting of
a stay of arbitration amounts to a denial of a motion to compel arbitration. Such was
the case in McCrary v. Byrd."6 In that case, plaintiff McCrary brought suit against
defendant Byrd for personal injuries stemming from a car accident. 65 Plaintiff's
insurance carrier, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company ("Nationwide"), then filed
an answer as a unnamed defendant based on its potential uninsured motorist
liability. '6 Limited discovery took place between the parties, but Nationwide soon
filed a motion to compel depositioh testimony of one of plaintiff's experts and for
sanctions for failure to comply with discovery requests. 167 McCrary68 responded by
filing a motion to compel arbitration, which Nationwide opposed.
Upon receipt of the various discovery and arbitration motions, the trial
court issued an order declaring that all motions with respect to arbitration "shall be
reserved by this court to be heard at a later time and date after proper notice and after
*

153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 470.
Id. at 470-71.
Id. at 471.
2000 WL 48497 (Tenn. App. Jan. 21,2000).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Tenn. Code. Ann. § 29-5-303(d) (2000).
M. R. Dillard,2000 WL 48497 at *1.
524 S.E.2d 817 (N.C. App. 2000).
Id. at 818.
Id. at 819.
Id.
Id.
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all depositions ... have been completed."' 169 Despite this order, the American
Arbitration Association sent notice to the court that it intended to proceed with
arbitration of the matter at hand. 70 Nationwide submitted a motion to stay
arbitration pending the completion of discovery, however, and the trial court granted
this request.1 71 McCrary then appealed the grant of the stay to the North Carolina
Court of Appeals. 17 ' Nationwide argued, and the court of appeals agreed, that the
appeal was interlocutory and should be dismissed.'73
The court of appeals first noted the general rule that there is no right to an
immediate appeal from interlocutory orders and judgments. 174 On the other hand,
an "order denying arbitration, although interlocutory, is immediately appealable
75
because it involves a substantial right which might be lost if appeal is delayed."'
The issue thus
presented was whether the trial court's stay was "an order denying
76
arbitration."'1

In determining that plaintiffs appeal was interlocutory and should be
dismissed, the court denied McCrary's arguments that the effect of the trial court's
ruling was to deny her request for arbitration and cause her additional delay and
expense." 77 The court stated that under the circumstances, it was not an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to briefly delay ruling on plaintiff's motion to compel
arbitration so that discovery may be completed. 7 1 Therefore, the court dismissed
McCrary's appeal. 179
C. Waiver of the Right to Arbitrate
In Smith v. Young Moving and Storage, Inc.," 0 plaintiff Kay Smith filed
suit against Young Moving and Storage ("Young") alleging that Young lost Smith's
personal property stored under contract at Young's facility.'' Pursuant to local
rules, the trial court entered a scheduling order setting June 30, 1999, as the deadline
for filing dispositive motions. 8 2 Because Young's original counsel withdrew from
the case on June 12, 1999, however, Young did not file a motion to compel
arbitration until July 2, 1999.113 The trial court subsequently denied the motion to

compel arbitration and Young filed an interlocutory appeal with the North Carolina
Court of Appeals. 4 The court of appeals found that although a confirmed
arbitration award is conclusive of all issues in a case and a bar to subsequent action,

169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

174. Id.
175. Id. at 819 (citing Burke v. Wilkins, 507 S.E.2d 913, 914 (N.C. App. 1998)).
176. See generally id.

177. Id. at 820-21.
178. Id. at 821.
179. Id.
180. 540 S.E.2d 383 (N.C. App. 2000).

181. Id. at 385.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id.
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a party has the right to ask a court to modify, correct or vacate an award.'85 This
finding, coupled with North Carolina's strong policy favoring arbitration, led the
court to conclude that the motion to compel arbitration was not a "dispositive"
motion precluded by the trial court's scheduling order.'86 The court further noted
that defendant's failure to file an affirmative defense of arbitrability did not manifest
a waiver of the contractual right to arbitrate.' 87
Although the presumption in favor of arbitration is strong, courts have not
been entirely unwilling to find a waiver of the right to arbitrate where circumstances
demand such a finding. For instance, in Thomas v. Desire Community Housing
Corporation,' the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals of Louisiana found that Desire
Community Housing Corporation ("Desire") waived the right to arbitrate because
of its actions in a lawsuit with the Thomas' ("Thomas").' 89
The suit began when Thomas filed a petition to recover damages caused
by the defective construction of their home by Desire.'9g Desire then filed an
exception of prematurity seeking arbitration pursuant to the construction contract. 191
Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs' counsel wrote a letter to Desire addressing matters prior
to arbitration, but Desire responded by "stonewalling" Thomas.' 92 As a result, no
arbitration took place between the parties and Thomas once again filed suit.' 93
Desire again filed an exception of prematurity, but this time the trial court overruled
the exception and the matter proceeded to trial. 94 In the midst of the trial, Desire
requested a stay of proceedings in favor of arbitration, but the court also denied this
request and entered judgment in favor of Thomas.' 9'
The issue on appeal was whether Desire waived the right to arbitrate by
requesting arbitration, participating in litigation, and then appealing the result of the
litigation based on arbitrability. 96 The court responded to the question presented by
examining the mandatory character of the UAA stay of proceedings provision in
section two. 197 The court found that a party who asserts an arbitration defense must
file a motion to stay proceedings and compel arbitration.' 98 Furthermore, the court
stated that a party must appeal the denial of such a motion immediately. 99 Finally,
the court concluded that if the party claiming the right to arbitrate further participates
in litigation without making such an appeal, the party will be deemed to have waived
the right to arbitrate. 200 Because Desire knew of its right to arbitrate, acted

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. at 386.
Id.
Id.
773 So.2d 755 (La. App. 2000).
See generally id.
Id. at 756-57.
Id. at 757.
Id. at 577, 579.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 759.
Louisiana's version of the UAA § 2 is found at La. Stat. Ann. § 9:4202 (2000).
Thomas, 773 S.2d at 759.
Id.
Id.
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inconsistent with that right, and consequently prejudiced Thomas, the court held that
20
Desire waived the right to arbitrate and affirmed the lower court's judgment. '
III.

SECTION

7:

WITNESSES, SUBPOENAS, DEPOSITIONS

While section seven outlines broad discovery powers of an arbitrator, courts
recognize some limits to these powers. In BJC Health Systems, Inc. v. Group
Health Plan, Inc,202 the Missouri Court of Appeals exercised its jurisdiction to
interfere with an arbitrator's discovery order when the order effectively abrogated
the decision of an arbitration panel in a prior dispute. The parties entered arbitration
proceedings pursuant to an agreement whereby BJC was to provide health care
services to persons enrolled in Group Health's health care plans.20 3 Group Health
previously arbitrated an unrelated dispute with another health care corporation in
which the court issued a protective order due to the highly confidential information
involved in the arbitration.0 4 This protective order, which was signed by the
arbitration panel, provided that materials related to the arbitration were confidential
2°5
In the present suit, BJC
and could only be disclosed to certain involved parties.
directed at the
Deposition"
Taking
for
a
"Subpoena
to
issue
arbitrator
the
requested
26
The arbitrator
party who opposed Group health in the previous arbitration.
granted the subpoena, and Group Health filed an injunction to enjoin BJC from
discovery of the confidential information.20 7 The trial court granted Group Health's
permanent injunction, and BJC appealed arguing that the trial court did not have
20 8
In
jurisdiction to interfere with the enforcement of the arbitrator's subpoena.
upholding the trial court's judgment, the court gave great deference to the protective
order issued the previous arbitration.209 The court reasoned that since BJC had not
demonstrated that any intervening circumstances had diminished or eliminated the
reasons for the protective order, it should be honored.2"0 The court went on to state
that arbitrators do not have latitude to abrogate the decisions made previously by an
211
arbitration panel in an unrelated dispute.

201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Id. at 761.
30 S.W.3d 198 (Mo. App. 2000).
Id. at 205.
Id. at 200.
Id.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 200.
Id.
Id. at 201.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 205.
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IV. SECTION 11: CONFIRMATION OF AN AWARD

Section eleven of the UAA gives courts the power to confirm arbitration
awards, provided the award is not invalid for any of the specified reasons under the
statute.2" 3 The following cases address some of the issues that courts face when
asked to confirm an arbitration award.
A. The Basic Principlesof Section Eleven
The application of section eleven is not always straightforward. States and
localities are beginning to adopt new approaches to alternative dispute resolution,
and these approaches may affect the manner in which courts view arbitration awards.
For instance, in Turgeon v. City ofBedford,214 plaintiff Henry Turgeon filed
a discrimination complaint against the City of Bedford ("Bedford") with the
Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination ("MCAD") rather than a state
or federal court.215 Turgeon and Bedford agreed to arbitrate their dispute pursuant
to MCAD Policy 96-1,2I6 and the arbitrator entered an award in favor of Turgeon.217
Bedford filed a notice of appeal asking the MCAD to set aside the award, but the
commission declined to grant the appeal." 8 Because the MCAD refused to set aside
the award, Turgeon felt that, pursuant to Policy 96-1, the MCAD lacked authority
to keep jurisdiction over the case. 21 9 As such, Turgeon filed a motion to confirm the
arbitration award pursuant to section eleven of the UAA.220
In response to Turgeon's motion to confirm, Bedford filed a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim under the Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(6). 22' Bedford asserted that section eleven was not the appropriate vehicle for
enforcing the arbitration award because Turgeon filed suit with the MCAD and not
the Massachusetts' courts.222 In its decision, the Superior Court agreed with Bedford
and dismissed Turgeon's motion to confirm. 223 The court reasoned that Chapter
151 B of the Massachusetts General Laws, through which an individual may file a
complaint with the MCAD, established a "comprehensive and exclusive" scheme for
addressing unlawful discrimination claims in the employment context.224 Inother
words, awards rendered pursuant to Policy 96-1 are not subject to review under
section 11 of the UAA because "the Legislature has
decreed that Chapter 15 1B shall
225
trump any law inconsistent with [that Chapter].

213. U.A.A. § 11.
214. 2000 WL 1804627 (Mass. Super. Nov. 30, 2000).
215. Id. at "1.
216. The court labels Policy 96-1, the "Program on Alternative Dispute Resolution." Id. Fora detailed
description of this policy, see id.at ** 1-2.
217. Id.
218. Id. at *2.
219. Id.
220. Id. Massachusetts' version of UAA section eleven can be found at Mass. Gen. Laws. ch. 251
(2000).
221. Turgeon, 2000 WL 1804627 at *2.
222. Id.
223. Id. at **3, 7.
224. Id. at *3.
225. Id. at *4.
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B. The ProceduralEffects of a Motion to
Confirm an ArbitrationAward
Removal is one example of a procedure that may be affected by a motion
to confirm an arbitration award. In CAP of MB, Inc. v. Champion Rock Products,
Inc.,226 the dispute arose because the Vice President of Champion Rock Products,
Inc. ("Champion") wrote a letter to the manager of CAP of MB, Inc. ("CAP")
demanding over $700,000 in payments and declaring CAP to be in breach of the
parties' mining contract. 227 After receiving the demand letter from Champion, CAP
filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association on August
18, 1999.228 Five days later, on August 23, 1999, CAP also filed a complaint for
injunctive and declaratory relief in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas.229
In December 1999, the arbitrator entered an award in favor of CAP, who
subsequently filed a motion to confirm the award under the same case number as the
complaint for injunctive and declaratory relief.230 In response, Champion filed a
petition for removal to the United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina.2 ' The issue before the district court was whether it should grant CAP's
motion to remand, which alleged that Champion failed to comply with the time
requirements of the removal statute.232
In the district court decision, the judges first turned to the removal statute
for guidance on the issue. 233 According to the court, section 1441 requires notice of
removal to a federal court with original jurisdiction "within thirty (30) days after the
receipt... of... the initial pleading setting forth the claim of relief upon which..
. [the] proceeding is based., 234 Champion argued the petition to remove was timely
because the motion for confirmation of the arbitration award was the "initial
pleading" that triggered the thirty day notice period.235 CAP, on the other hand,
ran from the filing date of the complaint for injunctive
argued the thirty day period
236
and declaratory relief.

before the district court, the
Because this was an issue of first impression
2 38
237
judges examined cases from other jurisdictions to reach their conclusion.
According to the court, "[t]hese cases all focus on the nature of the 'initial
proceeding' and whether it is so related to the arbitration as to make all subsequent
filings part of the same action." 239 Applying the facts at hand to this rule, the court

226.
227.
228.
229.

1I1 F. Supp. 2d 728 (D.S.C. 2000).
Id.at 729.
Id.
Id. at 730.

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 730-731.
Id. at 731.
Id.
Id. at 731-32.
Id. at 732.

237. The court cited the following cases in support of its conclusion: Marchant v.Mead-MorrisonMfg.
Co., 29 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1928); Hetherington & Berner,Inc. v. Melvin Pine & Co., 256 F.2d 103 (2d Cir.

1958); Manze v. State Farm Ins. Co., 817 F.2d 1062 (3d Cir. 1987).
238. CAP, I I F. Supp. 2d at 732-33.
239. Id. at 733-34.
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implied the thirty day period began to run with the filing of the initial complaint for
injunctive and declaratory relief.24 The court, therefore, granted CAP's motion to
remand.24'
V. SECTION 12: VACATING AN AWARD

Judicial review of arbitration awards is limited by statute.242 When parties
submit a matter to arbitration, courts may only confirm, vacate, modify or correct the
award and are not permitted to review the merits of the decision.2 43 There
are,
2
however, a host of reasons why a court might choose to vacate an award. "
A. Procurementof Award by Corruption,
Fraudor Other Undue Means
In Nasca v. State FarmMutual A utomobile InsuranceCompany,2 45 plaintiff
("Nasca") brought an action in state court to vacate an arbitration award rejecting
his claim for benefits under the underinsured/uninsured motorist coverage provision
of his auto insurance policy. 46 As part of the arbitration process, the policy required
that each party appoint an impartial arbitrator. 47 The arbitration panel unanimously
rejected his claim, and found in favor of the insurer ("State Farm"). 24' Four years
after the award, Nasca discovered that State Farm had previously established a
business relationship with the arbitrator it had appointed in the case and he sought
to have the award vacated.2 49 The trial court granted summary judgment on the
claim, vacated the award, and State Farm appealedY °
On appeal, the Colorado Court ofAppeals reversed the part of the summary
judgment that vacated the award.25 In so doing, the court emphasized that for
summary judgment purposes, Nasca must establish a connection between the
undisclosed business relationship with State Farm and its influence on the award.
The court explained how, under the Colorado statute, the plaintiff had the burden of
showing that the award was actually obtained by "undue means. 2 53 In the present
case, however, affidavits from the other two arbitrators showed that they agreed that

240. Id. at 734.
241. Id. In the final paragraph of the opinion, the court mentioned Champion's argument that the FAA
controlled the dispute at hand. Id. at 734. The court decided that no matter which law applied, the FAA
or the UAA, the removal analysis remained the same. Id. The court's conclusion, however, did leave
open the possibility of removal based on diversity of citizenship. Id. at 731.
242. Terra West Townhomes, L.L.C. v. Stu Henkel Realty, 996 P.2d 866, 870 (Mont. 2000).
243. Id.
244. U.A.A. § 12
245. 12 P.3d 346 (Colo. App. 2000).
246. Id. at 348.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 348.
253. Id. at 349.
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State Farm's arbitrator was completely fair and unbiased.25 4 Because of these
affidavits, the court of appeals ruled that the plaintiff failed to establish that the
award was procured in violation of the statute. 5
Conversely, the court of appeals affirmed the part of the summary judgment
which found that State Farm was obligated to disclose its close business relationship
with its arbitrator. 2" The court initially noted that the question of whether disclosure
was proper was a question of law for the court to decide, not a question of fact.257
It explained that arbitrators must maintain the highest degree of impartiality when
deciding disputes, without the slightest degree of friendship or favor towards the
parties.25 In this vein, the arbitrator has a duty to disclose to the parties any dealings
that might create an impression of possible bias, such as a business relationship.25 9
A close business relationship was found to exist in the present case because State
Farm had hired its arbitrator's law firm 72 times in a previous year and paid them
more than $70,000 in fees.2' As such,
the court affirmed the grant of summary
26
judgment with regard to this matter. '
B. ArbitratorPartiality,Misconduct and Bias
In Hartv. McChristian,262plaintiff ("McChristian") and defendants ("Hart")
were part of a limited partnership that owned and operated a radio station.263 As part
of the partnership agreement, plaintiff owned eighteen percent of the partnership
interest and defendants owned ten percent. 264 A third party owned the remaining
seventy-two percent of the partnership interest.263 The parties' agreement gave
defendants exclusive discretion in the management and control of the business, but
also provided that the general partners could be removed if the limited partners
holding fifty percent of the partnership interest so proposed. 266 Following such a
proposal, removal would be accomplished by agreement of the limited partners
holding seventy-five percent of the partnership interest. 267 If the general partners
objected to their removal, the matter would be submitted to arbitration.268
McChristian later acquired the third party's seventy-two percent interest in the
partnership, giving him ninety percent ownership in the radio station.269
McChristian then voted for removal of the Harts from their position as
general partners, alleging they had mismanaged the radio station, misappropriated

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.

Id.
Id.
Idat 351.
Id. at 350.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
36 S.W.3d 357 (Ark. App. 2000).
Id. at 359.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 360.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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partnership funds and operated the company for their personal benefit.17
McChristian also filed a complaint in state court with these same allegations, along
with an order requiring arbitration should defendants object to their removal.27 ' The
parties held an arbitration hearing, and the arbitrator issued an award in favor of
McChristian. 7 The Harts objected to the award because they claimed McChristian
was the true owner of only eighteen partnership shares at the time they were
removed from their position. 73 The state court confirmed the arbitrator's award and
the Harts appealed to have the trial court's decision overturned and have the award
vacated.274
The Arkansas Court of Appeals reviewed the state arbitration statute and
looked at the relevant portions of section twelve that would allow for vacating the
award.2 75 The Harts alleged the award should be vacated because the arbitrator failed
to grant a continuance that was reasonably requested and failed to include the Harts'
appointed arbitrator in a post-arbitration conference. 276 The appellate court first
noted that the only grounds for vacating the award based on this would come from
subsection (a)(2) (misconduct by arbitrator) or (a)(4) (refusal to postpone hearing
upon good cause shown) of section twelve of the UAA.277 The court further noted
that no Arkansas court had ever reviewed an arbitration award on the ground of
case of Ebasco
to the Alaska
procedural irregularities, and therefore looked
2 9
278
Constructors,Inc. v. Ahtna, Inc., ("Ebasco"), for guidance.
In Ebasco, the Alaska Supreme Court held that arbitrators' procedural
decisions are entitled to a "deferential review" and that a litigant should be required
to show "gross error" to obtain reversal on procedural grounds.280 Although the
Arkansas court declined to adopt the "gross error" standard, it did make clear that
arbitrators' procedural decisions should be given deference."' As such, the court
trial court erred in refusing to vacate the award and
ruled it could not hold that the 282
could not find any misconduct.
In Greenway Cooperative Service Co. v. FrontierCommodities, Inc.,283
respondent ("Frontier") alleged that appellant ("Greenway") was responsible for the
poor quality of alfalfa hay harvested from Frontier's field. 284 The parties agreed to
arbitrate their dispute without counsel.28 On the day of the arbitration, Frontier's
arbitration representative realized he would be late and telephoned the arbitrator.8 6

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 363.
Id.
Id. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-108-212(a) (1987).
932 P.2d 1312 (Alaska 1997).
Dale, 36 S.W. 3d 357.
Id. at 363 (citing Ebasco, 36 S.W.3d 357).
Id.
Id. at 364.
2000 WL 665387 (Minn. App. May 23, 2000).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Nonetheless, the arbitrator went forward with the arbitration and heard Greenway's
evidence. 7 When Frontier's representative arrived, the arbitrator summarized
Greenway's evidence for him, and then heard Frontier's evidence.2" 8 During the
course of the arbitration, the arbitrator personally gathered evidence and presented
it to the parties at other hearings.289 The arbitrator eventually issued an award stating
that Greenway was not liable for the damage to Frontier's crop.2' 9 Greenway then
sued Frontier in court for damages, and Frontier counter-claimed and moved to
vacate the award.2 9' The trial court vacated the award based on UAA2 92 section
twelve, which provides for vacating an award upon the showing of an arbitrator's
partiality.2 93
On appeal, the Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's
decision.2 94 The court started its analysis by noting that whether challenged conduct
constitutes "evident partiality" orprejudicial misconduct is a legal question reviewed
de novo.2 9' The court emphasized that an arbitrator is not only to avoid such
conduct, but must also avoid the appearance of partiality of prejudice.29 The court
relied on Minnesota case law which holds that contacts between an arbitrator and a
party, or between arbitrators, that might create an impression of possible bias,
require that the arbitration award be vacated.297 In the present case, the court found
undisputed evidence that the arbitrator and Greenway's representative engaged in
informal, friendly conversation relevant to the case before Frontier's representative
arrived at the arbitration hearing.298 Because this conversation could have created
an impression of possible bias, it provided a basis for vacating the award.2 99 The
court also found that Frontier's rights had been substantially prejudiced when the
arbitrator allowed Greenway to present evidence at the hearing before Frontier's
representative arrived.3°° Because of these acts of bias by the arbitrator, the appellate
court affirmed the trial court's decision to vacate the award.3°'
In Umana v. Swidler & Berlin, Chartered,°2 former employee ("Umana")
sued his former law firm (the "Firm") and eleven firm members, claiming that he
had been an equity partner in the firm.30 3 Umana's employment contract included
an arbitration provision, and an arbitration panel issued an award in favor of the
Firm.3 °4 Umana sought to have the award vacated because Umana's former law firm

287. Id.
288. Id.

289.
290.
291.
292.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Minn. Stat. § 572.19 (1998).

293. Greenway, 2000 WL 665387.

294. Id.
at *4.
295. Id.
at *3.
296. Id.
297. Id. (citing Pirsigv. PleasantMound Mutual Fire Ins., 512 N.W.2d 342 (Minn. App. 1994)).

298.
299.
300.
301.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

302. 745 A.2d 334 (D.C. App. 2000).

303. Id. at 336.
304. Id.
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had also previously employed the third, neutral arbitrator.0 5 Also, the neutral
arbitrator previously worked at the FTC several years earlier with a current partner
at the Firm.3 °6 The trial court confirmed the award, ruling that Umana waived his
claim of arbitrator bias when he failed to object to the arbitrator's appointment.07
The trial court noted that it found "nothing in the record that comes even close30to8
demonstrating partiality, much less 'evident partiality,' on [the arbitrator's] part."
Umana failed to show that the arbitrator's partiality had been "direct, definite, and
capable of demonstration, rather than remote, uncertain or speculative.,, 309
On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court's decision.3 The standard for vacating an award based on evident partiality
of the arbitrator, the court stated, is that "specific facts which indicate improper
motives on the part of the arbitrator" must be shown.3 1 ' Here, the court held
Umana's showing that the arbitrator did not disclose his relationship with Umana's
previous firm did not automatically translate into evident partiality.1 2 The court
quoted a prior case that held that in vacating an award due to bias, the bias "must 'be
13
due to some financial interest or other loyalty owed to one side of the dispute."
In the Umana case, in contrast, the arbitrator's
relationship with Swidler & Berlin
31 4
amounted to little more than triviality.
C. ArbitratorExceeding the Scope ofAuthority
In Water Pipe Extension, Bureau of Engr. Laborers' Loc. 1092 v. City of
Chicago,1 5 the city employees union ("Union") brought suit against the City of
Chicago ("City") for violating their collective bargaining agreement. 31 6 The City's
Department of Water wanted to hire outside subcontractors to help increase the rate
at which the City replaced its water mains.1 7 Part of the collective bargaining
agreement between City and the union stated that before City hired subcontractors
for any work, City would attempt to have City's employees perform the work.318
City decided to hire subcontractors to conduct a three-year study to compare the
performance of work done by subcontractors and City's employees.3t 9
Union alleged City violated the subcontracting provisions of the agreement
when it hired outside contractors to perform some of its water main construction

305. Id. at 337.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 345.
311. Id. at 340.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 340-41 (citing CellularRadio Corp. v. OKIAm. Inc., 664 A.2d 357, 360-361 (D.C. 1995)
(quoting Celtech. Inc. v. Broumand, 584 A.2d 1257, 1259 (D.C. 1991))).
314. Id. at 341.
315. 741 N.E.2d 1093 (Il1. App. 2000).
316. Id. at 1097.
317. Id. at 1095.
318. Id. at 1096.
319. Id.
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projects.32 ° Union also filed a grievance three months later related to subcontracting
in the Department of Sewers.32' Following an arbitration hearing, both arbitrators
issued decisions in favor of City.322 Union then filed a petition in state court to have
the awards of both arbitrators vacated.323 The trial judge vacated both awards, and
remanded the case for re-arbitration.324 On re-arbitration, the original arbitrators
were used and both issued supplemental awards which refused to make any
modifications to the original awards.325
This time, Union moved to have both supplemental awards vacated and
asked that the grievances be remanded to a different arbitrator.326 The trial court
agreed to remand the case and the two parties agreed the issue on remand would be
limited to damages.327 In its orders vacating the arbitration awards, the trial court
recognized a contractual violation by City.3 28 Upon remand, the new arbitrator found
a specific amount of damages.329 City moved to vacate the award, but the trial court
refused to do so. 330 City appealed, and the Illinois Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court's decision. 3
The appellate court held that generally, under the Illinois arbitration statute,
an arbitration award may only be vacated based on one of the specific criteria listed
in the Act.332 However, the court pointed to section 12(e) of the Act, pertaining to
awards given based upon arbitration agreements that are part of collective bargaining
agreements. 333 The court also looked to Illinois case law for direction. 334 Illinois
case law holds that a court must enforce a labor-arbitration award if the arbitrator
acts within the scope of his or her authority335and the award draws its essence from the
parties' collective bargaining agreement.
A court must first decide the issue of whether an arbitrator has, in fact,
overstepped its bounds. 336 To decide this, a reviewing court "determines whether the
arbitrator limited himself to interpreting the collective bargaining agreement; if not,
the award violated the agreement to arbitrate. 337 Here, the appellate court found that

320. Id.
321. Id. at 1097.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 1098.
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 1103.
332. Id. at 1099.
333. Id. Section 12(e) of the Illinois act states that the grounds for vacating such an award shall be
those which existed prior to the enactment of the UAA. See Title 710 III. Comp. Stat. §§ 5/1- 5/23
(1999). Thus, the court held that the only bases for vacating such an award are fraud, corruption,
partiality, misconduct, mistake or failure to submit the question to arbitration. City of Chicago, 741
N.E.2d at 1099.
334. City of Chicago, 741 N.E.2d at 1100.
335. Id.
336. Id.
337. Id. (quoting Bd. ofEduc. of Community High School Dist.No. 155 v. IL Educ. Lab. Rel. Bd., 617
N.E.2d 269, 275 (Ill.App. 1993)).
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the original arbitrators' awards did draw its essence from the parties' Collective
Bargaining Agreement ("CBA").338 The arbitrators did not negate any provision of
the collective bargaining agreement, and specifically, did not negate any portion of
the article which the Union alleges was violated.3 9 Therefore, the arbitrators did not
act outside the scope of their authority because their award was based on the CBA.340
In BEMI, L.L.C. v. Anthropologie,Inc.,34 the plaintiff lessor ("BEM") filed
a claim for forcible entry and detainer against defendant lessee ("Anthropologie"),
seeking possession of the leased space and $48,197.23 in rent allegedly due. 42
Anthropologie signed a lease to rent space from BEM in BEM's shopping mall upon
the completion of the building's construction.343 Rent was due 90 days after
"substantial completion" of the building and the building's architect certified the
building as substantially complete on June 20, 1997. 4 Nonetheless, Anthropologie
did not open for business until August 20, 1997, claiming that was the date of
substantial completion of the building.3 45 As such, Anthropologie refused to pay rent
under46the lease in September although duly demanded by BEM, who then filed
3
suit.
Anthropologie filed an answer and a counterclaim.3 47 The trial judge
concluded that the entire counterclaim and two of Anthropologie's affirmative
defenses were arbitrable. 348 The case was arbitrated, and Anthropologie was
awarded $185,767 for construction delays caused by BEM. 349 Anthropologie was
also awarded $48,964.30 in damages for sprinkler modification and fire safety
installation. 3 0 Further, the arbitrators found that the date of substantial completion
was August 19, 1997.35' Anthropologie subsequently filed a motion in the United
States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to confirm the award, and
BEM filed a motion to vacate the award. 52
The court first held that the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), not the
Illinois arbitration statute, would govern the case because the choice-of-law
provision in the lease did not extend to the arbitration clause.353 Therefore, the court
stated that the F.A.A. applied to the case because it deals with transactions involving
commerce." 4 The present case involved a Pennsylvania company leasing land from
an Illinois corporation and, reading the commerce clause broadly, invoked the

338.
339.
340.
341.
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
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354.
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2000 WL 1849574 (N.D. 111.Dec. 15, 2000).
Id. at *3.
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FAA. 3"s Nonetheless, the court noted that its decision to review the vacatur
argument under the FAA, as opposed to the Illinois statute, had no bearing on the
ultimate outcome of the case, in that the "exceeded their powers" standards in both
acts are nearly the same.356
BEM asked the court to vacate the arbitration awards because the arbitrators
had exceeded their powers under the Illinois statute." 7 In particular, BEM alleged
the arbitrators ignored an exclusive remedy provision in the lease, that the
arbitrators' award of lost profits to a new store at a new location was entirely
speculative, and that the arbitrators incorrectly awarded prejudgment interest on
unliquidated sums and then set an illegal interest rate. 358 At the outset, the court
noted that as long as an arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the
contract and acting within the scope of his authority, the fact that "a court is
convinced there was serious error committed does not suffice to overturn the
'
The court then reviewed the arbitration panel's record and held that the
decision."359
arbitrators' analysis of the word "may" in the exclusive remedy provision of the
lease was such that the court could not overturn that portion of the award, as there
was no gross legal error.3 6 The court also held that there was no gross legal error
in the panel's award of lost profits to a new business, as the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals had awarded such damages in a strikingly similar case.36' Therefore, the
court ruled that as to the exclusive remedy provision in the lease, and the lost profits
award, the arbitration panel had not exceeded its powers.362 The court also instructed
both parties to submit additional briefs to the court on the subject of the 8.5% interest
rate awarded by the panel, when Illinois statute limits creditors' interest to 5%.363
Lastly, the court dismissed all but one of Anthropologie's third-party claims against
36
the Nagle Firm and dismissed BEM's Forcible Entry and Detainer complaint. '
In North Miami Educ. Assn. v. North Miami Community Schools, 365 North
Miami community schools ("School") decided not to renew the contract of a nonpermanent teacher, and the North Miami Education Association ("Association") filed
a grievance. 366 Following arbitration, the arbitrator decided that the School violated
four sections of the Master Contract between the parties.3" However, the arbitrator
ruled that while in most circumstances such violations would warrant the teacher's
reinstatement, the power to reinstate non-permanent teachers in Indiana is reserved
by statute.368 As such, the arbitrator lacked the authority to reinstate the teacher. 69

355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.

Id. at *5.
Id. at *7.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting United Paperworkers Int 1Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 38 (1987).
Id. at *8.
Id. at **8-9.
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id. at **10-13.
736 N.E.2d 749 (Ind. App. 2000).
Id. at 751-52.
Id. at 752-53.
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Association then filed suit in state court to vacate the award, alleging the
arbitrator's decision was in manifest disregard of Indiana state law and the arbitrator
thus exceeded his authority.370 Association specifically pointed to the fact that
because Indiana state law allows schools and exclusive representatives to agree that
teacher dismissals are subject to binding arbitration and the law provides arbitrators
the power to reinstate teachers, the arbitrator should have granted the
reinstatement.37' In response, the School filed a motion to dismiss the Association's
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and for lack
372
of subject matter jurisdiction.
The trial court dismissed Association's complaint,
3 73
appealed.
and Association
The court held that while Indiana law does allow school employers and
exclusive representatives to mutually agree to arbitration, the statute does not contain
any language with respect to an arbitrator's authority to renew a nonpermanent
teacher's contract.3 74 As such, the statute does not require a school employer to
collectively bargain with regard to the retention of the employee.3 75 The court thus
held that Indiana law precluded the arbitrator from reinstating a non-permanent
teacher because the law allowed collective bargaining with regard to such matters,
but did not require it and did not expressly give an arbitrator the power of
reinstatement.376 The court ruled that the arbitrator did not exceed his power.377
In Custom Decorative Moldings, Inc. v. Innovative Plastics Technology,
Inc.,378 the dispute arose over a contract between Custom Decorative Moldings
("CDM") and Innovative Plastics Technology ("IPT") which dealt with a special
molding process that CDM purchased from IPT.3 79 Disputes arose and CDM
submitted a demand for arbitration, as called for in their contract, and the arbitrator
eventually found in favor of CDM.380 CDM then had the award confirmed in state
court on summary judgment.3
The court stated that it must confirm the award unless grounds existed for
modifying or vacating or correcting the award.382 In its suggestions for summary
judgment, IPT asked the court to vacate the award and not modify or correct it, in
part because the arbitrator exceeded his power by awarding damages greater than the
recovery permitted by law and contract, and by finding one individual jointly and/or
severally liable.383 As a basis for this allegation, IPT claimed that no damages could
be awarded for breaches of the agreement between it and CDM.38 4 IPT claimed there
were no facts presented in the arbitration proceeding from which the arbitrator could

370.
371.
372.
373.
374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
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Id. at 755-56.
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2000 WL 1273301 (Del. Ch. Aug. 30, 2000).
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have found a breach of that agreement.385 The court disagreed and determined that
there was, in fact, evidence in the arbitration record from which the arbitrator could
find one or more breaches by IPT.3 s6 Further, the court emphasized that IPT did not
cite to a single place in the record, a single authority, or even put forth a reasoned
argument as to why the arbitrator should not have found one of the parties to the
arbitration jointly and severally liable.38 7 As to both points, the court held that the
arbitrator did not exceed his authority in issuing the award.3"8
In Chicago Fire Fighters Union Local No. 2 v. City of Chicago,' 9 the
plaintiff ("Union") filed a petition to enforce an arbitration award that vacated the
discharges and suspensions of twenty-eight firefighters who participated in an
unauthorized retirement party at a firehouse. 3' 9 The defendant ("City") filed a
counter-claim to have the award vacated.3 9' City had previously engaged in
in a collective
as setforout
incident,
over the In
with Union
arbitration
before the
summary
judgmentbargaining
their motion
the parties.392
agreement between
trial court City alleged that the arbitrator exceeded his authority and that the award
violated public policy.3 93 The trial court denied City's counter-petition to vacate the
award.394 It found that City was could not raise public policy as a ground for
vacating the award because it previously agreed to submit the question of
timeliness3 95 and the issue of remedy to the arbitrator.3 96
On appeal, the appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court,
vacated Union's arbitration award and remanded to the arbitrator.3 97 The appellate
court stressed that if the arbitrator makes the award within the scope of authority and
the award is based on the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement, the court will
normally not vacate the award. 98 Despite this, the court held that in unique
situations where the award is made within the scope of the arbitrator's authority and
the award is based on the agreement, the court would still vacate the award if it is
repugnant to established norms of public policy.399 Public policy, the court
emphasized, is to ultimately be determined and protected by the court system.400 An
agreement to submit to arbitration does not, according to the court, operate as a
device or structure to circumvent questions of public policy, "especially where, as
40
here, Union initiated an action in a court to enforce the arbitration award." ' The

385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id. at *8.
388. Id.
389. 735 N.E.2d 108 (111.App. 2000).
390. Id. at 109.
391. Id. at 109-10.
392. Id. at 110.
393. Id. at 112.
394. Id.
395. Id. The city's disciplinary actions were brought nearly eight years after the incident occurred, and
the city failed to bring such actions until six months after it learned of the incident.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 118.
398. Id. at 113.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 118.
401. Id.
at 114.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

27

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2001, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 10
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION

[Vol. 2001, No. 2

court therefore found erroneous the trial court's determination that City was
foreclosed from challenging the award as against public policy.
In cases such as this where public policy exceptions exist, the appellate
court held that they must perform a two-step analysis.4 °2 The first step is to
determine if "well-defined and dominant public policy" can be identified.4 3 The
second step is to determine if the arbitrator's award, as reflected in the interpretation
of the agreement, violated the public policy.4 4 The court found a strong public
policy in favor of protecting the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of Illinois
through safe and effective fire protection services. 4 5 The court then found the
arbitrator based the award not on watching the video tape that was part of the
evidence used against the fire fighters, but rather, based on his own assumptions that
these fire fighters would not act this way again in the future. 4' Because of this, the
arbitrator was unable to fashion an appropriate award. 401 Rather, the arbitrator
placed the fire fighters back into a situation where they might again pose a danger
to the public. 408 The court thus found that the award should be vacated because the
arbitrator exceeded the scope of his authority.4 9 Specifically, the arbitrator failed
to consider the merits of the case when rendering his award.410
In O&K Glass Co. v. Innes Construction Co., Inc.,4 a dispute arose
between contractor ("Innes") and subcontractor ("O&K") over time delays in
building a skyway at the University of North Dakota in Grand Forks. 42 Both sides
demanded arbitration as provided in the parties' contract. 413 The arbitrator found in
favor of O&K, concluding that Innes waived its original schedule by accepting
goods from Skytech, the company that O&K had subcontracted with to manufacture
the glass panels.414 The arbitrator also found that Inntes waived its original schedule
by asking the university for time extensions. 41 5 The arbitrator concluded that O&K
was therefore entitled to a new start date for performance of its installation work, and
that Innes substantially interfered with O&K's ability to work by hiring a second
subcontractor to help install the glass panels. 4 6 The arbitrator awarded $47,500 to
O&K representing the unpaid balance owed to them under their contract with Innes,
and awarded $400 to Innes for site cleanup costs. 4 17 O&K moved to confirm the
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award in court and Innes moved to vacate the award, alleging the arbitrator exceeded
his powers."" The trial court confirmed the award.419
On appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
decision. 420 The court stated that it would only vacate an award if it is "completely
irrational," which means it must be "mistaken on its face or so mistaken as to result
in real injustice or constructive fraud., 421 The court pointed out that an arbitrator's
mistake of law or fact is not a sufficient ground for vacating the award.422 The court
then examined the record of the arbitration hearing.423 It found that it was not
irrational to believe that Innes and O&K were being held jointly and severally liable
by Skytech when examining their contract, and that Irmes' decision to accept late
goods from Skytech gave O&K a new starting point for performance.424 As such,
the court affirmed the decision of the trial court to confirm the award because the
arbitrator had not acted irrationally and not exceeded his power as alleged.425
In Terra West Townhomes, 426 a real estate development limited liability
company ("Terra") brought action against one of its partners ("Henkel"). 42' Henkel
counter-claimed and brought third party claims against other partners, claiming a
right to compensation for duties performed. 42' Following an arbitration hearing, the
arbitrator awarded compensation to Henkel for duties performed. 429 Henkel moved
to confirm the award, while Terra, along with the third parties, sought to vacate the
award on the ground that the arbitrator had exceeded his power and disregarded
Montana law.430 The trial court confumed the award.43'
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's
decision.432 Terra alleged that the arbitrator exceeded her powers by making an
award for Henkel based on the theory of equitable estoppel. 433 The supreme court
stated its rule for judging when arbitrators exceed their powers: "an arbitrator's
authority is limited by the bounds of the arbitration agreement, and courts may
vacate awards that extend beyond the contractual scope of the arbitration. An
arbitrator exceeds his powers when he decides matters which were not submitted to
him. 434 Further, the court emphasized that if the remedy is rationally derived from
the arbitration agreement, it will not vacate the award. 435 The court agreed with the
trial court's assessment that principles of equitable estoppel are clearly available to
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arbitrators and that the power of arbitrators-conceming every body of law is broader
than the power of courts concerning those same bodies of law.436 Thus, the trial
court properly refused to vacate the arbitration award. 3 7
D. Refusal to PostponeHearingor Hear Relevant Evidence
438

In Harper v. Providence Washington Insurance Company, the plaintiff
("Harper") was injured in an auto accident during the course of his employment. 39
The driver at fault in the accident had liability insurance policy limits of$100,000.44

Harper's injuries resulted in damages in excess of that amount and Harper made a
claim for uninsured motorist/underinsured motorist ("UM/UIM") coverage through
his employer."' Defendant ("Providence") was the insurance carrier for the
employer." 2
The tortfeasor against whom Harper filed a third-party action offered to
settle the case for $50,000, but Harper refused this offer and had the matter set for
trial. 4 Providence contested the nature and extent of Harper's injuries and the
matter of the UM/UIM coverage was set for arbitration.' However, Providence
requested a continuance of the arbitration, pending resolution of the third-party
action against the tortfeasor." 5 The arbitrator refused and the matter proceeded to
arbitration. 4 6 The arbitration panel awarded Harper $350,000, but allowed a credit
to Providence of $100,000 in the third-party case, and the net award was entered as
$250,000.44' Providence claimed that the arbitrators' refusal to postpone the hearing
until resolution of the third-party action prejudiced Providence, and Providence
sought to have the award vacated."8' The trial court refused to vacate the award and
Providence appealed that decision."49
The Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the decision of the trial court and
refused to vacate the award. 450 The court agreed with Providence that the Uniform
Arbitration Act governed the matter, but relied on Pennsylvania precedent to dispose
of the issue.45' The court explained that an exhaustion clause that requires the limits
of bodily insurance coverage to be exhausted prior to any claim for underinsured
motorist coverage is against Pennsylvania public policy. 452 Such exhaustion clauses

therefore do not preclude recovery by the insured from underinsured motorist
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coverage. 411 The court stated that a credit did, nonetheless, have to be given to the
insured's insurance for any such settlement and the ultimate damage award.1 4 Here,
the court said Providence was not prejudiced by the panel's refusal to postpone the
hearing because Providence received credit for the entire limits of the tortfeasor's
policy of $100,000 and that entire amount was used to find the net underinsured
award.455
E. Time Limit Bar to Vacating an Award
In UnitedStates PostalService v. NationalPostalProfessionalNurses, 6
the Postal Nurses Union ("Union") filed a grievance involving the Postal Service's
use of contract nurses. 457 The matter was arbitrated, and an award was issued in
favor of Union. 45" The Postal Service filed a complaint in district court, seeking to
have the award vacated on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded the scope of his
authority.459 It later filed an amended complaint which sought both to vacate and to
modify the arbitration award.460 Union then filed a motion to dismiss the Postal
Service's complaint because it was filed more than 30 days after the award was
delivered to Postal Service, a violation of the Maryland Uniform Arbitration Act.46'
The Postal Service noted that it not only sought that the award be vacated, but also
that it be modified, and that they had ninety days to seek to have an award
modified.462
The district court granted Union's motion to dismiss because the Postal
Service's petition originally sought only to vacate the award and was not filed within
the thirty day time period.463 With respect to the amended complaint, the court held
that it did not relate back to the original filing date because relation back applies only
when "permitted by the law that provides
the statute of limitations applicable to the action."'464 The court granted the Union's
motion to dismiss because the statute of limitations borrowed from Maryland for
reviewing arbitrators' awards is mandatory. 465 The fourth circuit affirmed the
decision of the district court, and held that the Postal Service's challenge to the
arbitrator's award in both complaints could only be rectified by vacation, not
modification, of the award.'1
In School Districtof the City ofMonessen v. Apostolou Associates, Inc.,467
the school district ("District") hired Apostolou Associates ("Apostolou") to provide
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architectural services for the design of a new school building, and the contract
included an arbitration clause that would apply to claims or disputes that might
potentially arise between the parties.4 68 The clause stated that any amount in dispute
less than $100,000 would be arbitrated, but the parties would need to mutually agree
in the future to arbitrate any dispute greater than that amount. 469 District later
incurred damages allegedly caused by Apostolou's deficient workmanship, and
District sought indemnification from it.470 District also refused to pay any more
under their contract with Apostolou, to which they objected.47'
Apostolou demanded arbitration of the matter, but District filed a court
complaint praying for damages in excess of one million dollars arising from
Apostolou's alleged contract breach.4 "2 The district also requested that the American
Arbitration Asssociation ("AAA") end the arbitration because the dispute was in
excess of $100,000. 4 "3 The arbitrator, however, found the two disputes to be
unrelated and, because Apostolou's claim was for less than $100,000, the arbitrator
had authority to hear both matters under the contract.47 4 In response, District filed
for a stay of arbitration, which was granted. 75
On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed the decision of the
lower court.4 7 6 The appellate court rejected Apostolou's argument that the
arbitrator's decision to hear both cases was actually an "award" under the Uniform
Arbitration Act, and as such, the District had only thirty days to move to vacate the
award.477 The court held that the arbitrator's decision regarding its own authority to
hear the cases was not an "award" under the Act.4 78 Rather, the court stated, the
arbitration had not yet begun, and there was no "award" to be made at that point in
the proceedings.479
Apostolou also argued that District waived its objection to the arbitrability
of the claim when it argued the issue with the arbitrator. 4 0 However, the superior
court also rejected this argument,48' pointing to the case First Options of Chicago,
Inc. v. Kaplan.82 In First Options, the United States Supreme Court held that
merely arguing the arbitrability issue483to an arbitrator does not indicate a clear
willingness to arbitrate the issue itself.
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In Allstate InsuranceCompany v. Perea,484 defendant ("Perea") was injured in a car
wreck and plaintiff ("Allstate") was defendant's insurer." 5 The other driver's
insurance paid Perea its policy limits, and Perea sought additional compensation
from Allstate under his underinsured motorist coverage.486 Because Perea had one
Allstate policy that covered three different vehicles, he sought $75,000 under the
principle of judicial stacking because each individual policy provided for $25,000
in UIM coverage.4 7 The parties arbitrated the issue of the extent of defendant's
damages under an arbitration clause in the policy. 48" The clause stated that if an
arbitration award greater than the financial responsibility limits of the state were
awarded, which is $25,000 in the state of New Mexico, then either party would have
the right to trial on all issues.4 9 The arbitration panel awarded Perea $52,500 and
Allstate filed an action in the trial court to determine the extent of Perea's damages
in a trial de novo.49 ° Perea filed a motion with the court to confirm the award, which
the trial court granted.'
On appeal, the New Mexico Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's
decision.492 The Court first determined that, based upon a prior New Mexico
Supreme Court case, the arbitration provision in this insurance policy was not
repugnant to public policy and was not ambiguous.4 9 3 The court then held that the
principle ofjudicial stacking did not apply to the arbitration provision, and that the
New Mexico statutory financial responsibility requirement of $25,000 was the
proper interpretation of the parties' arbitration provision. 4 Finally, the court held
that no arbitration agreement existed between the parties such that Allstate could be
bound to pay an arbitration award in excess of $25,000. 49 ' The court thus vacated
the arbitration award, according to section twelve of the state's arbitration statute,
and remanded the case to the trial court to try, de novo, the extent of Perea's
damages.496

484.
485.
486.
487.
488.
489.
490.
491.
492.
493.
494.
495.
496.

Allstate, 8 P.3d 166.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 167.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 170.
Id. at 169 (citing Bruch v. CNA Ins. Co., 870 P.2d 749 (N.M. 1994)).
Id. at 170.
Id.
Id.
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VI. SECTION 13: MODIFICATION OR CORRECTION OF AWARD

Under the UAA "upon application made within ninety days after delivery
'
of a copy of the award to the applicant,"497
a court reviewing an arbitration award
should confirm the award unless certain conditions call for modification or
correction."' Under section thirteen, these conditions are:
(1) [t]here was an evident miscalculation of figures or an evident
mistake in the description of any person, thing or property
referred to in the award; (2) [t]he arbitrators have awarded upon
a matter not submitted to them and the award may be corrected
without affecting the merits of the decision upon the issues
submitted; or (3) [tlhe award is imperfect in a matter of form, not
affecting the merits of the controversy.499
Section thirteen also provides that "an application to modify or correct an award may
be joined in the alternative with an application to vacate the award.

,50

A. Time Limit Bar to Modify or Correct an Award
When a party seeks to raise a defense to the confirmation of an arbitration
award, the failure to make a timely request to modify or correct the award will bar
such a defense.50' In Swan v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 0 2 the
arbitrators entered the initial award of $150,000 plus interest and costs for the
plaintiff ("Swan") on April 17, 1998.503 On April 28, 1998, the defendant
("American Family") "filed an application with the arbitrators requesting
modification of the award." 5°4 On May 13, 1998, in response to American Family's
application, the arbitrators amended the award and declared that the maximum
amount recoverable under law and the insurance contract was $100,000.05 "Within
thirty days following entry of the amended award but more than thirty days after the
initial award, American Family asked the trial court to vacate and modify the
arbitration award. ' '506 "[The] [p]laintiff filed a motion requesting that the trial court
confirm the initial award. 50 7 "After a hearing, the trial court modified the arbitration
award to $100,000 plus interest and costs, and entered judgment in favor of [Swan]
S508

497.
498.
499.
500.
501.
502.
503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.

U.A.A. § 13(a).
U.A.A. § 13(b).
U.A.A. § 13(a).
U.A.A. § 13(c).
Kutch v. State FarmMut. Auto. Ins. Co., 960 P2d 93, 97 (Colo. 1998) (en banc).
Swan v. American Family Mutual Insurance Company, 8 P.3d 546, 547 (Colo. App. 2000).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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On appeal, Swan asserted that "the initial award became final when
American Family failed to ask the court to vacate or modify the award within thirty
days of delivery to the parties. ' 9 The court held that the applicable statutory
provisions were included in Colorado's version of the UAA,5" ° which provides a
time limit from delivery of an arbitration award to file a motion to vacate or a motion
to modify or correct.511 Relying on Kutch, the plaintiff asserted that American
Family's application to the arbitrators to modify their award did not toll the time
limits.5 2 In Kutch, the Colorado Supreme Court held that failure to apply to the
court for vacation or modification of an arbitration award within the time period
mandated by Colorado law acts as a bar to modification." 3 The court of appeals
distinguished Kutch because there was no application to the arbitrators for
modification of the award.51 Therefore, the court determined that Kutch did not
consider the tolling issue raised by American Family.5" 5
The Colorado Court of Appeals agreed with American Family's argument
that the application filed with the arbitrators to modify the initial award in effect
tolled the thirty-day requirement. 1 6 The relevant section of the Colorado statute,
section 13-22-211, provides that, on application of a party within twenty days after
delivery of the award, the arbitrators may modify or correct the award "upon the
in section 13-22-215(1)(a) and (1)(c)... for the purpose of clarifying
grounds stated
51 7
the award."
The court of appeals also stated that the effect the statute has upon the other
time limits in the UAA is a matter of first impression in Colorado."' The court of
appeals referenced other jurisdictions that had addressed the issue.5" 9 The court first
reffered to Konicki v. Oak Brook Racquet Club, Inc.520 The court in Konicki dealt
with similar statutes and held that application to the arbitrator tolled the time for
seeking review in the trial court "until the petition is finally disposed of by the
arbitrator, regardless of whether the relief requested is granted or denied. ''52' The
court in Swan also recognized that other jurisdictions have reached a contrary
result.522 The Swan court found the reasoning in Konicki more persuasive "because
it gives effect to all the provisions of the statutes involved and reflects due concern
for the efficiency of the arbitration process and for judicial economy. 523

509. Id.
510. Id.
511. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-22-211, 13-22-214, 13-22-215.
512. Swan, 8 P.3d at 547.
513. Kutch, 960 P.2d at 97.
514. Swan, 8 P.3d at 547.
515. Id.
516. Id.
517. Id at 548. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §13-22-211.
518. Id.
519. Id.
520. Id.; Konicki v. Oak Brook Racquet Club, Inc., 441 N.E.2d 1333 (II1. App. 1982).
521. Konicki, 441 N.E.2d at 222.
522. Id. The Court cited to Groves v. Groves, 704 N.E.2d 1072 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999) and Teleometrics
Intl, Inc. v. Hall, 922 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. App. 1995).
523. Swan, 8 P.3d at 548.
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The Court in Swan ultimately held that an application to the arbitrators tolls
the time limits for an action to vacate or modify an arbitration award.524 According
to the court, the time limits "begin to run anew upon delivery of the arbitrators' order
'
to the parties."525
The court also cited the legislative intent of section 13-22-202,
which was to make the arbitration process effective and efficient while promoting
judicial economy as another basis for their decision.526
B. Grounds to Modify or Correct:
What Type of 'Miscalculation'or 'Mistake' is Sufficient?
In North Blvd. Plaza v. North Blvd. Assoc.,527 the plaintiff ("Plaza")
appealed a trial court order in favor of defendants ("Associates") denying the
plaintiff's motion to confirm a modified arbitration award.528
Plaza leased a parcel of real estate to the Associates.529 Subsequently, Plaza
filed an action against the defendants to recover rent due under the parties' lease
agreement. 530 The dispute was submitted to binding arbitration under the terms of
"
North Carolina's arbitration statute as required by the lease agreement.53
' The
arbitrators issued a finding that defendants, based on a rent formula in the lease,
"were entitled to an 8.5% return on certain investments made for capital
improvements to the property" plus interest totaling $80,712.532
After the initial order, Plaza submitted an application to the arbitrators to
modify or correct the arbitration award.5 33 "[Plaza] argued that the arbitrators used
an improper method to calculate the amount of rent due. 5 34 Plaza wanted the award
to be increased to $166,123.535 In response to Plaza's application, the Associates
objected to any modification arguing that
the arbitrators had no authority under the
5 36
UAA to award Plaza the desired relief.
After a hearing, the arbitrators issued the modified award, which increased
Plaza's award to $154,532.1 3' The modified award stated, in part:

524.
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
536.
537.

Id.
Id.
Id. See Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-22-202 (1999).
526 S.E.2d 203 (N.C. App. 2000).
Id. at 204.
Id.
Id.
Id. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § § 1-567.14(a)(1)-(a)(3) (1999).
North Blvd. Plaza, 526 S.E.2d at 204.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 205.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2001/iss2/10

36

2001]

Correll et al.: Correll: Recent Developments
The Uniform ArbitrationAct
1. The [a]rbitrators have determined that they committed an
evident miscalculation of figures when they included all interest
deductions through the date of arbitration for the year in which the
investment was made. Instead, the [a]rbitrators should have
allowed a deduction or credit for each year from the year in which
the investment was made through the date of arbitration."'

The Associates then filed a motion in the superior court to set aside the
modified award on the ground the arbitrators "exceeded their authority under [North
Carolina law]." '39 At the same time, Plaza filed a motion in the superior court to
confirm the modified award.54°
In an affidavit, one of the arbitrators stated that the arbitration award was
modified because "he had 'inserted the wrong formula [when determining the
amount due plaintiff in the arbitration award] which did not achieve the intent of the
[a]rbitrators."' ' " The "trial court entered an order setting aside the [m]odified
[a]ward and confirming the [a]rbitration [a]ward on the ground that the arbitrators
did not have the authority to modify [it]."' '
The dispositive issue on appeal was whether the arbitrators had based their
determination of the award due to Plaza on an "evident miscalculation of figures,"
pursuant to section 1-567.14(a)(1).-4
The powers of arbitrators in North Carolina are set forth in the statute. 5"
"The act provides that an arbitrator may, upon the application of a party made within
twenty days of the delivery of an arbitration award or upon a court order, modify or
correct the award based on the grounds stated in the act." ' The North Carolina act
states an award may be modified or corrected where "[t]here was an evident
miscalculation of figures or an evident mistake in the description of any person,
thing or property referred to in the award."'5 " The North Carolina Court of Appeals
as "mathematical errors committed
has defined an evident miscalculation of figures
5 47
by arbitrators which would be patently clear.
The court of appeals determined that the arbitrators statement that they had
committed an evident miscalculation of figures was not controlling.5' g The court
stated that "the record show[ed] the [a]rbitration [a]ward was modified because the
arbitrators used the wrong formula to calculate the amount due to Plaintiff.,1 49 The
court concluded "[t]hat the use of an incorrect formula to determine an award is not
an evident miscalculation of figures." ' Therefore, according to the court, the

538. Id.
539. Id.
540. Id.
541. Id. (quoting Aff. Richard E. Proctor (Oct. 29, 1998)).
542. Id.
543. Id. SeeN.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-567.14(a)(1).
544. Id.
545. Swan, 8 P.3d at 548.
546. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-567.14(a)(1).
547. North Blvd. Plaza, 526 S.E.2d at 205 (quoting Fashion Exhibitors v. Gunter, 255 S.E.2d 414,419
(N.C. App. 1979)).
548. Id.
549. Id.
550. Id.
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arbitrators did not have the authority under North Carolina law to modify the
arbitration award.5
C. An Order Under Section Thirteen of the UAA
Does Not Providefor an Award ofAttorney Fees
552

In Terra West Townhomes, the respondent ("Stu Henkel") argued that
Montana's version of the UAA 53 'allows for the recovery of attorney fees incurred
in confirming an arbitration award.'5 54 The appellants ("Terra") argued that the
UAA "does not authorize a court to award attorney fees incurred in confirming an
arbitration award."5 55 The trial court concluded that, under Montana law, "attorney
fees are not allowed unless specifically provided by statute or agreement except
under extraordinary circumstances..., 556 The court ultimately concluded that Stu
Henkel was not entitled to recover its attorneys fees because this was not such a
circumstance. 5 7
The Montana Supreme Court state that traditionally Montana courts have
not awarded attorney fees absent statutory or contractual authority.5 8 However, the
court also stated that "under limited circumstances 'a district court may award
attorney fees to make an injured party whole under its equity powers."' 559 In
addition, the court acknowledged it had granted an equitable award of attorney fees
in instances where bad faith or malicious behavior were involved in the past' 60 The
court also referred to the narrow exception to the traditional rule it had created "for
the award of attorney fees to compensate a party who, through no fault of her own,
was forced to hire an attorney to write and argue a motion to dismiss. ' 561 This
exception has been narrowly drawn and is applicable only where the action is utterly
without merit or frivolous.562
The court recognized that Montana law "allows a district court to award the
costs and disbursements incurred in pursuing an order confi-rning, modifying, or
correcting an arbitration award., 563 But the Montana Supreme Court held that the
relevant statute "did not provide for an award of attorney fees."'5( Thus, the court
concluded
that there was "no statutory or contractual basis for an award of attorney
,,565
fees.

551.
552.
553.
554.
555.
556.
557.
558.
559.
560.
561.
562.
563.
564.
565.

Id.
Terra West, 996 P.2d 866.
Mont. Code Ann. § 27-5-314 (1997).
Terra West, 996 P.2d at 873.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing Tanner v. Dream Island,Inc., 913 P.2d 641 (Mont. 1996)).
Id. (quoting Tanner, 913 P.2d at 650).
Id.
Id. (citing Foy v. Anderson, 580 P.2d 114 (Mont. 1978)).
Id. (citing Tanner, 913 P.2d at 650-51)
Id. See Mont. Code Ann. § 27-5-314 (1997).
Terra West, 996 P.2d 866 at 873.
Id.
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The court also noted that the instant case did not "fit within any of the
narrow exceptions to the traditional rule for the award of attorney fees. 566 The court
then determined that Stu Henkel was not "an injured party would, require the use of
the court's equitable powers to be made whole. 567 In addition, the court concluded
that "Terra West's action against Stu Henkel was [not] without merit or frivolous,
in light of the arbitrator's finding that Stu Henkel Realty improperly filed a
construction lien...."56' Therefore, the Court ultimately concluded that the trial court
had not abused its discretion "when it refused to award Stu Henkel Realty, its
'
attorney fees incurred in confirming the arbitration award."569
VII. SECTION 14: JUDGMENT

OR DECREE ON AWARD

Section fourteen of the UAA is just one of the provisions of the statute that
gives arbitrators the authority to award costs or expenses to parties in an arbitration
proceeding.570 While section nine of the Act specifically forbids the award of
attorney fees, section fourteen is less specific. The following case addresses the
issue of whether an arbitrator may award attorney fees pursuant to section fourteen.
In Goldstein v. 91st Street Joint Venture,571the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland had to decide, inter alia, if courts may award attorney fees under section
fourteen of the UAA. 572 According to section 14(b), "[a] court may award costs of
the petition, the subsequent proceedings, and disbursements" upon entry of a
judgment or decree confirmning, modifying or correcting an arbitration award.573 In
its analysis of section fourteen, the court first noted that the term "disbursements"
includes reasonable attorney fees at both the trial and appellate level. 574 The court
then determined that the use of the term "may" in the statute indicated that courts
have discretion in deciding whether to award attorney fees.5 75 Applying these
principles to the case at hand, the court determined that on remand the lower court
should exercise its discretion with regard to awarding attorney fees.576

566. Id.
567. Id.
568. Id.
569. Id.
570. See U.A.A. §§ 9, 14.
571. 750 A.2d 602 (Md. Spec. App. 2000).
572. See id. at 617-18. Maryland's version of UAA section fourteen is located at Md. Cts. & Jud.
Proc. Code Ann. § 3-228 (2000).
573. Goldstein, 750 A.2d at 617.
574. Id.
575. Id.
576. Id. at 618.
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VIII. SECTION 16: APPLICATIONS TO COURT

Section sixteen of the UAA allows parties to request the review of
arbitration awards through motions to the courts.177 Under this section, the making
of an agreement to arbitrate within a state "confers jurisdiction on the [circuit] court
[of that state] to enforce the agreement under this Act and to enter judgement on an
award thereunder. ' 78 Furthermore, arbitration awards rendered in a particular
79
district give courts in that jurisdiction the authority to confirm the award.1
In CPM Productions,Inc. v. Mobb Deep, Inc., "0 the parties disputed the
"
' The
rights of one party to withdraw from their mutual contractual obligation.58
arbitration provision of their agreement stated:
[a]ny claim or dispute arising out of or relating to this agreement
or the breaching thereof shall be governed by the laws of the State
of New York and settled by arbitration in New York, New York
in accordance with the rules or regulations then obtaining of the
American Arbitration Association. The parties hereto agree to be
bound by the award in such arbitration and judgment upon the
award rendered by the arbitrator may be entered by any court
having jurisdiction thereof. 582

Upon non-performance by the appellants ("Mobb"), the appellees ("CPM")
sent a demand for arbitration notice to the American Arbitration Association
("AAA") in Chicago, requesting an arbitration hearing on the issue of Mobb's
breach of the parties' contract. 583 Despite adequate notice, Mobb failed to appear at
the arbitration hearing.5 84 At the hearing the arbitrator awarded CPM damages plus
expenses. 585 A copy of the arbitrator's award was sent to Mobb by the
costs 5and
86
AAA

Mobb failed to comply with CPM's demand for payment. 58 7 Accordingly,
CPM filed a complaint against Mobb in the circuit court of Cook County seeking "to
enforce the arbitration award." 588 Mobb failed to appear or otherwise answer and
in default.58 9 The court entered judgment on the award in favor of
was found
0
59

CPM.

577. U.A.A. § 16.
578. Chicago Southshore & South Bend R.R. v. Northern Ind. Commuter Transp. Dist., 703 N.E.2d
7, 9 (111. 1998) (quoting 710 Il. Comp. Stat. Ann. § 5/16 (West 1996)).
579. Maiocco v. Greenway Capital Corp., 1998 WL 48557 at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 1998).
580. 742 N.E.2d 393 (III. App. 2000).
581. Id. at 395
582. Id.
583. Id.
584. Id.
585. Id.
586. Id.
587. Id.
588. Id.
589. Id.
590. Id.
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Mobb formally filed a special and limited appearance."" Mobb additionally
"filed a motion to quash the purported service of process, which was assertedly
ineffective, and to vacate the court's entry of default judgment for want of personal
jurisdiction."'5 92 "The circuit court refused to quash service and vacate its judgment,
and [Mobb's] timely appeal followed."'5 93
"The dispositive issue presented by [the] appeal was whether the circuit
court properly exercised its subject-matter jurisdiction to enter judgment on the
award of the arbitrator."5' 94 Mobb's main contention on the appeal was lack of
jurisdiction.5 95 The court of appeals concluded:
a party's right to have an arbitration award entered as a judgment by the
circuit court, without that party having to institute and prosecute an action
at law, is purely a creature of statute and, as such, requires the prevailing
party to satisfy all statutory conditions necessary for the circuit court to
exercise its constitutionally conferred subject-matter jurisdiction and enter
judgment on the award.5 96
Accordingly, the court determined that section sixteen of the UAA "represents a
prerequisite to the circuit court's exercise ofjurisdiction over an application seeking
judgment on an award specifically conditioning the court's jurisdiction on the
particular locale of the arbitration proceedings as provided for in the parties'
agreement."'5 97 "The court stated that "only where the parties' arbitration agreement
provides for arbitration in Illinois will the Act confer jurisdiction on the Illinois
circuit courts to enter judgment."59 The court then stated that only in such a
circumstance will the circuit court be able to properly exercise its authority.5 99
Accordingly, the order of the circuit court entering default judgment on the
arbitrator's award issued in favor of CPM was vacated. 600
In May ConstructionCompany, Inc. v. Thompson,6° the petitioner ("May")
sought a writ of prohibition which the court treated as a writ of certiorari.6 °2 May
argued on the appeal that the "circuit court had no subject-matterjurisdiction to enter
the orders respecting discovery or any other procedures then before the arbitrator. ,603
May also argued that arbitration proceedings governed by the Arkansas UAA limit
the circuit court to those acts permitted by an appellate court.6"

591.
592.
593.
594.
595.
596.
597.
598.
599.
600.

601.
602.
603.
604.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 400.
Id.
Id. (citing Chicago Southshore, 703 N.E.2d 7).
Id.
Id. at401.
Thompson, 20 S.W.3d 345.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 349.
Id.
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The Supreme Court of Arkansas stated that the Arkansas version of the
UAA described the proper procedure to pursue arbitration. 6°5 The court then stated
that "[ujnder the [section] 16-108-202, a party to a contract containing an arbitration
clause may make an initial 'application' to the court for the court to order
arbitration. 60 6 Under the applicable statutes, the court acknowledge that the proper
court was "a circuit or chancery court subject to the appropriate venue
requirements., 60 7 "Upon application to the proper court, the party seeking to enforce
the 'arbitration' clause in the contract must produce the contract language allowing
the arbitration, and the other party may make an "application" to oppose the
arbitration if there is a 'substantial and bona fide dispute' as to the validity or
existence of an agreement to arbitrate."6°8 "The court may determine whether the
contract requires arbitration, and then may either order arbitration or refuse it. ''609
The court noted that most important to the issues presented in the case was
the section entitled "Applications to court," which describes when applications can
be made to the court in arbitration matters. 60 This section states:
[e]xcept as otherwise provided, an application to the court under
this subchapter shall be by motion and shall be heard in the
manner and upon the notice provided by law or rule of court for
the making and hearing of motions. Unless the parties have
agreed otherwise, notice of an initial application for an order shall
be served in the manner provided by law for the service of a
summons in an action.61
The court inferred from the language of the statute that "the legislature
anticipated that parties would make both the 'initial application' to refer the matter
to arbitration and other 'applications' for additional matters to be heard by the
overseeing circuit or chancery court., 61 2 The court also noted that "applications"
may be made "by a party to stay arbitration proceedings, to promptly proceed with
the arbitration [or to] enforce subpoenas issued by the arbitrators."6 ' Thus, the court
determined, based on the language of the statute, that the "legislature anticipated that
circuit or chancery court that order arbitration could continue to have jurisdiction
and some control in the proceedings in certain circumstances. '61 4
May argued that section sixteen of the Arkansas code specifically limits the
court's jurisdiction "to enforce the agreement under this subchapter and to enter
judgment on an award thereunder. ''615 The court ultimately disagreed with May's

605.
606.
(1999).
607.
608.
609.
610.
611.
612.
613.
614.
615.

Id. at 350.
Id; Ark. Code Ann. §16-108-202 (1999). See also Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-108-217, 16-108-218
Thompson, 20 S.W.3d at 350.
Id.; Ark. Code Ann. §16-108-202(b).
Thompson, 20 S.W.3d at 350; Ark. Code Ann. §16-108-202(b).
Thompson, 20 S.W.3d at 350; Ark. Code Ann. §16-108-216 (1999).
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-108-216.
Thompson, 20 S.W.3d at 350.
Idat 351.
Id.
Id.
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argument and concluded that the circuit court did not exceed its jurisdiction by
issuing orders to enforce the arbitrator's discovery orders." 6
IX. SECTION 17: COURT AND JURISDICTION

Section seventeen of the UAA refers to a court's jurisdiction to enforce an
arbitration agreement and enter judgment on an arbitration award.6t 7 The UAA
defines court as "any court of competent jurisdiction in this State. 618
Prior to the May case, the Arkansas UAA had been the subject of little or
no review in the Arkansas state appellate courts. 619 According to the court, the
existing case law did not address the appellate court's role "in these sorts of 'motion'
or 'application' disputes., 620 The court also noted, "[i]f there is no case law and no
compelling policy on an issue, provisions of the UAA should be construed
62 consistent
with the decisional law of other states which have adopted the Act." 1
Accordingly, because the Arkansas courts had not addressed the issue, the
Court held that it was proper for the Court in this case "to look to similar
proceedings in other courts for guidance. 622 The Court determined that the relevant
federal statutes and case law offer persuasive authority for the proposition that courts
retain jurisdiction to enforce orders already issued by the arbitrator, as in the instant
case. 623 Noting the language in the Arkansas act conferring continuing jurisdiction
on the overseeing court through the application process, and the presence of federal
case law allowing a court to enforce an arbitrator's order, the court concluded that:
if is not apparent here that there was a lack of jurisdiction [from the circuit court],
an act in excess ofjurisdiction on the face of the record, or that the proceedings are
erroneous on the face of the record.624

616.
617.
618.
619.
620.
621.
622.
623.
624.

Id at 352.
U.A.A. § 17.
Id.
Thompson, 20 S.W.2d at 351.
Id.
Id. (citing Heineman v. Charno, 877 S.W.2d 224 (Mo. App. 1994)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 351-52.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2001

43

Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2001, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 10
(Vol. 2001, No. 2

JOURNAL OFDISPUTE RESOLUTION
X. SECTION 18: VENUE

Section eighteen of the UAA directs the venue in which an arbitration
hearing must be held. Section eighteen states:
[a]n initial application shall be made to the court of the [county]
in which the agreement provides the arbitration hearing shall be
held or, if the hearing has been held, in the county in which it was
held. Otherwise the application shall be made in the [county]
where the adverse party resides or has a place of business or, if he
has no residence or place of business in this State, to the court of
any [county]. All subsequent applications shall be made to the
court hearing the initial application unless the court otherwise
directs.625
In MunicipalAuthority of the City of Monongahela v. Carroll Township
Authority,626 the Carroll Township Authority ("CTA") and the Township of Carroll
("Township") appealed from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny
County ("Allegheny CCP") that modified an arbitrator's award adversely to CTA
and the Township.627 The dispute in Municipal arose out of a contract where the
Municipal Authority of the City of Monongahela ("MACM") agreed to accept
sewage water from CTA for treatment at MACM's water treatment facilities.6 18 The
agreement provided that MACM would be compensated based on a per gallon rate
which was determined by a method specified in the agreement. 629 The agreement
also provided that any dispute over the rates charged were to be resolved by
arbitration.630
Beginning in 1981, conflicts arose between the parties and the parties were
involved in various suits and arbitration against each other.63' Ultimately, a dispute
632
arose over the 1997 rates MACM charged CTA and CTA sought to arbitration.
After some disagreement regarding the arbitration, CTA turned to the Washington
County CCP seeking to compel arbitration. 633 The instant case regarding compulsory
arbitration of the 1997 rates was assigned to Judge Gilmore of the Washington
County CCP seeking to compel arbitration. 634 All of the parties are located in
Washington County. 35
Aditionally, the parties disputed whether the 1998 rate dispute was properly
the subject of arbitration. 36 The parties again turned to the Washington County CCP

625.
626.
627.
628.
629.
630.
631.
632.
633.
634.
635.
636.

U.A.A. § 18.
761 A.2d 194 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2000).
Id. at 195.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 196.
Id.
Id.
Idat 195.
Idat 196.
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Subsequently,
wherein Judge Terputac ordered compulsory arbitration.637
compulsory arbitration was ordered by Judge Gilmore concerning the dispute over
the 1997 rate schedule.638 Judge Gilmore further ordered that the arbitration be
conducted before the same arbitrator who had heard the parties' dispute over the
1998 rate schedule. 63 9 The arbitrator had an office in Allegheny County where the
arbitration took place.6 0
MACM appealed the arbitrator's initial decision, regarding the 1998
dispute, to the Allegheny County CCP.6' After MACM appealed, CTA requested2
that the Allegheny County CCP transfer venue to the Washington County CCP.6
The Allegheny County CCP declined CTA's request and modified the arbitrator's
award by increasing the rates charged to CTA.63 CTA appealed the Allegheny
County CCP order to the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.6 CTA asserted
that the Allegheny County CCP abused its discretion in not transferring the appeal
of the arbitrator's award to the Washington County CCP.65
The parties disagreed as to which statutory provision regarding venue
governed the proceeding. 46 MACM asserted that the Arbitration Act of 1927
governed the case because the Agreement was signed in 1971, prior to the effective
date of the UAA, therefore superceding the UAA 647 Ultimately, the court determined
that MACM lost under either the Arbitration Act or the UAA and did not decide
which statutory provision controlled. 648
The court also concluded that the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure
governed the arbitration award, rather that the UAA, even though the rule states
"except as otherwise prescribed by the general rules" the initial application to a court
shall be made to the county in which the arbitration hearing was conducted and the
statute states that the action shall be brought against a political subdivision only in
the county in which the political subdivision is located unless "otherwise provided
by an Act of the Assembly."" 9 The court stated that the Rules of Civil Procedure are
"general rules" within the meaning of the UAA governing venue, "[e]xcept as
otherwise proscribed by the general rules" and within the meaning of a statute which
provides for the venue of the court of common pleas as prescribed by the general
rule. 6s° Therefore, if the arbitration agreement does not prescribe a county in which
the arbitration must be brought, the Rules of Civil Procedure permit an action against
a political subdivision to be brought only in the county in which the political

637.
638.
639.
640.
641.
642.
643.
644.
645.
646.
647.

Id.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 196.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

Id. at 196.
Id.

648. Id. at 197 n. 2.
649. Id at 199-200.
650. Id. at 199.
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subdivision is located.51 In the instant case, proper venue was the county where the
township was located, not the county where the arbitrator made his report.5 2
XI. SECTION

19: APPEALS

Section nineteen of the UAA lists the judgment and orders relating to
arbitration that may be appealed.653 Under section 19(a), the following decisions or
rulings are appealable:
(1) [a]n order denying an application to compel arbitration made
under Section 2; (2) [a]n order granting an application to stay
arbitration made under Section 2(b); (3) [A]n order confirming or
denying confirmation of an award; (4) [a]n order modifying or
correcting an award, (5) [an order vacating an award without
of decree entered pursuant
directing a rehearing; or (6) ajudgment
654
to the provisions of this act.

Section 19(b) provides that appeals from these judgments and orders "shall be taken
in the manner
and to the same extent as from orders or judgments in a civil
655
action.,'

In Suffolk County Sherif's Department v. AFSCME Council,616 the county
sheriffs department filed application to vacate an arbitration award ordering
reinstatement of a previously discharged jail officer with back pay.657 The Superior
Court of Suffolk County vacated the award and ordered rehearing before a new
arbitrator within sixty days. 6" The officer's union appealed and the appellate court
held that "an order vacating the award of an arbitration ordering a rehearing is not
appealable under [Massachusetts law] .659
The appellate court determined that the trial court's "order for a rehearing
[before a labor arbitrator] is not an act finally adjudicating the rights of the parties
affected" and, thus, is not appealable.60 Final adjudication occurs "when the court
acts after the arbitration proceeding is terminated.""'

651. Id. at 200.
652. Id.
653. U.A.A. § 19.
654. U.A.A. § 19(a)(I)-(6).
655. U.A.A. § 19(b).
656. 737 N.E.2d 1276 (Mass. App. 2000).
657. Id. at 1277.
658. Id.
659. Id.
660. Id. at 1278 (quoting School Comm. ofAgawam v. Agawam Educ. Assn., 359 N.E.2d 956 (Mass.
1977)).
661. Id.
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XII. SECTION

21:

UNIFORMITY OF INTERPRETATION

Section twenty-one of the U.A.A. states that the "act shall be so construed
as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which
enact it."662
In Group Health Plan, Inc. v. BJC Health Systems, Inc.,66' the appellate
court stated that according to section 435.450 (Missouri's arbitration statute), the
Act should be "construed as to effectuate the general purpose to make uniform the
law of those states that enact it." 66 Consequently, the court referenced Missouri
statutory law and concluded that "opinions of the courts of other jurisdictions which
have adopted the UAA are shown greater than usual deference." 665 Therefore, if
there is no Missouri authority and no compelling policy to overcome the need for
uniformity, provisions of the UAA should be construed as consistent with the
decisional law of other signatory states. 666
BRENT A. CORRELL
S. JACOB SAPPINGTON
DAVID SIMS
BLAKE J. TOMPKINS

662.
663.
664.
665.
S.W.2d
666.

U.A.A. § 21.
30 S.W.3d 198 (Mo. App. 2000).
Id. at 202. See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 435.450 (1992).
Group Health Plan, 30 S.W.2d at 202 (quoting Westridge Inv. Group, L.P. v. McAtee, 968
288,291 (Mo. App. 1983)).
Id.
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